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The Kaplan Lecture on Human Rights
The Case for
Self-Determination
GUYORA BINDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
My purpose in this lecture is to make the case for the self-
determination of peoples.
Now, defending self-determination at this late date may seem
like opening the barn door after the liberation of the proverbial
livestock. Although western governments long denied the legal
authority of the principle, they helped engineer the Balkanization
and decolonization of Europe's empires that produced most of
the world's existing states.' With this process nearly complete,
self-determination is now generally accepted as a legal "right" of
"peoples." 2 And the continuing power of self-determination as a
political aspiration is attested by the democratization of more
than fifty states within the last five years, and the secession of
* Professor of Law, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo, Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor of Human
Rights, Stanford Law School, 1991-92. This is an expanded version of the Leah Kaplan
Lecture on Human Rights delivered on April 22, 1992. References to recent events are
made from the perspective of that moment. I am especially indebted to John Barton,
John Ely, Barbara Fried, Tom Grey, Mark Kelman, Peggy Radin, Bill Simon, Joseph
Weiler and Bob Weisberg for helpful discussions during the lecture's preparation, and
to Dean Paul Brest and Leah Kaplan for making the event possible.
I A useful account of the invocation of self-determination in disposing of Haps-
burg and Ottoman territory at Versailles may be found in ALFRED COBBAN, NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION 16-34 (1944). For brief accounts of the European Concert's inter-
ventions in the revolts of the Ottoman Empire's Balkan provinces in 1875-78, 1908, and
1912-13, see GUYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION: THE
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY 20-21 (1988); see also SIR GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON MACCOBY,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 463-77 (1928). A concise but nuanced legal
history of the decolonization process is available in HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 58-88 (1988) (analyz-
ing the evolution of the right to self-determination).
2 WILSON, supra note 1, at 88.
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almost twenty within the last year.3 It seems that self-determina-
tion doesn't need my support.
So the first question I will turn to is why self-determination
needs defense. My answer depends on a distinction between
what I will call the universalist and nationalist components of self-
determination. The universalist component of self-determination
is satisfied wherever institutions of government are majoritarian.
Given a polity, the universalist component of self-determination
requires only that its population be fully and fairly represented.
The nationalist component of self-determination is satisfied to
the extent that institutions of government are identified with par-
ticular communities. Hence, the nationalist component of self-
determination does not permit us to take any polity as given. It
applies to "peoples" rather than "populations" and includes the
right of such peoples to form polities of their own.
This distinction is prompted by the observation that the end
of the Cold War has not only occasioned democratization
throughout the world, it has also released long-frustrated nation-
alist aspirations. By no mere logic did democratization require
the reunification of Germany or the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Granting that the Soviet government was evil, did it fol-
low that the Soviet Union was an evil empire, its people not just
oppressed but conquered and colonized?
That democratization did imply national independence in the
experience of so many, reminds us that the rhetoric of self-deter-
mination has. long fused the potentially contradictory claims of
democracy and nationalism, of majority rule and minority separa-
tism. The recognition that self-determination has both universal-
ist and nationalist components brings into focus a controversy
that would otherwise escape our notice.
The nub of the hidden controversy is this: While majority
rule has been increasingly endorsed by international law and is
no longer controversial in political theory, the boundaries within
which majorities rule are most often viewed as ethically arbitrary.
Thus, the universalist component of self-determination, requir-
ing democracy and civil equality, has triumphed, at least in the-
ory. The nationalist component, identifying a polity with a
particular group or "people," remains potent in practice, but
quite disreputable in theory.
3 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 47 & n.4 (1992).
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The reason for this is the postwar West's discomfort with
group identity. We associate group identity with prejudicial ster-
eotyping. It follows that group separatism must be immoral, ex-
cept as a remedy of last resort against discrimination, and
irrational, because premised on the mistaken belief that group
identity is natural or immutable. We will see that despite its ap-
parent endorsement of self-determination, international law in-
corporates these skeptical attitudes toward group identity and
group separatism. The continuing controversy over its national-
ist component is the reason that the principle of self-determina-
tion of peoples needs defense.
So the second question I will turn to is whether the nationalist
component of self-determination is defensible. And my answer
will be a qualified "yes." While group identities are contingent
rather than natural or immutable, they are neither unfortunate
nor ethically arbitrary. Group identity is valuable in general, and
good reasons may exist for creating and preserving particular
group identities.
Critics of the nationalist component of self-determination see
political boundaries as justified only to the extent that they pro-
tect individual rights. But political boundaries also protect group
identities. And while shared parentage may not be a sufficient
reason to identify with a group, shared moral purpose is. We can
define and advance our moral ends only through joint action, and
we are justified in forming political communities for the pursuit
of those ends, exclusive though those political communities be.
Because we have moral reasons to put our powers at the disposal
of those who share our moral ends, the boundaries of our polit-
ical communities need not be ethically arbitrary.
II. WHY DOES SELF-DETERMINATION NEED DEFENSE?
Self-determination is vulnerable to critique because it embod-
ies an inherent tension between majority rule and minority sepa-
ratism. After World War I, the Allies indulged separatism on
grounds of pragmatism rather than principle; after World War II
they repudiated separatism as imprudent and incoherent. The
process of decolonization eventually established self-determina-
tion as a principle of law. But it did not establish the authority of
minority separatism. Instead, the neocolonial powers and their
post-colonial clients agreed to treat colonial secession as an ex-
ceptional departure from a general regime of state sovereignty.
Recognizing that decolonization cannot be distinguished from
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secession, political philosophers have denied the legitimacy of
both, unless absolutely necessary to secure the political and civil
rights of individuals. Hence, even the limited legal authority of
the nationalist component of self-determination is unstable, rest-
ing on an indefensible distinction between secession and
decolonization.
A. The Antinomic Origins of Self-Determination
From its inception during the romantic era, the ideal of self-
determination has fused two potentially incompatible values: the
popular sovereignty championed by the French Revolution and
the nationalist resentment provoked throughout Europe by the
French armies of occupation.4
This internal tension need not discredit the ideal of self-de-
termination. In its ambivalence, self-determination was charac-
teristic of an entire generation of dynamic concepts set in motion
by the contradictions of late-Enlightenment thought. The ideal
of individual self-realization articulated by such figures as Schil-
ler, Emerson, Mill, and Nietzsche can be seen as a resolution of
Kant's tortured ambivalence between freedom and duty.5 The
romantic depiction of the self as a work of art reconciled the En-
lightenment's antithetical conceptions of freedom as spontane-
ous self-expression and as the self-disciplined subordination of
passion to reason.6
4 For the inspiring effect of the French Revolution on many German intellectuals,
see CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 33, 52-53 (1975);JOHN EDWARD TOEWS, HEGELIANISM: THE
PATH TOWARD DIALECTICAL HUMANISM, 1805-1841, at 30-48 (1980); BERNARD YACK,
THE LONGING FOR TOTAL REVOLUTION: PHILOSOPHIC SOURCES OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT
FROM ROUSSEAU TO MARX AND NIETZSCHE 89-98 (1986). For the nationalist reaction
against the revolution in Germany, see GEORG G. IGGERS, THE GERMAN CONCEPTION OF
HISTORY 7, 16, 20 (1983); FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VON BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FUR
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr (1828); ToEws, supra, at 50, 57-58; cf JAMES
Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA 66-73 (1990)
(arguing that the cult of Germany's "ancient constitution" preceded and shaped reac-
tion to the French Revolution). See generally Orro GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THE-
ORY OF SOCIETY 1500-1800 (Ernest Barker trans., 1934) (arguing that natural law
theories implemented during French Revolution wrongly ignore importance of associa-
tions in insulating individual from state and stabilizing politics).
5 See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Poet, in SELECTIONS FROM RALPH WALDO EMER-
SON 222 (Stephen E. Whicher ed., 1957); RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in EMER-
SON, supra, at 147; IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(Lewis White Beck trans., 1990); JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT (1862); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. III (1859); FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974); FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, ON
THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN (Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby trans.,
1967).
6 See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 1-23 (1979); YACK, supra note
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What individual self-realization was for romantic moral psy-
chology, national self-determination was for romantic politics.7
Thus we can view national self-determination as one reconcilia-
tion of the competing ideals of the rule of the people and the rule
of the virtuous. Figures as diverse in outlook as Marx, Mill, and
Mazzini could all agree: Only by forging their own revolutionary
struggles for liberty, without foreign intervention, could the cra-
ven peoples of central Europe become at once capable and wor-
thy of self-rule.8 As art was for the individual, so revolution
would be for the nation: an act of self-creation.
Self-determination's original associations with political
revolution and artistic innovation illustrate an important point
about nationalism. We often assume that nationalism must exalt
some and denigrate others on the basis of characteristics that
people are powerless to change. Yet the nationality exalted by
romantic nationalists was something achieved rather than re-
ceived, more artifact than historical fact. Among these early na-
tionalists, patriotism tended to inspire caustic social criticism
rather than complacent chauvinism. Self-determination entailed
not self-congratulation, but ruthless self-examination and rest-
less self-reform.9
B. The Apparent Rise and Real Fall of Wilsonian Self-Determination
Throughout the nineteenth century, national self-determina-
tion remained an insurgent principle, largely rejected by interna-
tional law. In Napoleon's wake, the Concert of Europe strove to
restore the status quo ante in Europe, rejecting the authority of
popular will to determine either borders or the governments that
ruled within them. The "society of nations" that emerged from
Vienna was an exclusive club, admission to which was discretion-
ary.' 0 Thus, nations had no status in international law until in-
corporated into a recognized state. Moreover, a state's treatment
4, at 133-84 (discussing Schiller's concept of aesthetic freedom as a response to Kantian
dilemmas).
7 See Arnold J. Toynbee, Self-determination, 244 Q REV. 317 (1925).
8 KARL MARX, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction, in
EARLY WRITINGS 243-57 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., 1975); JOSEPH
MAZZINI, Faith and the Future, in ESSAYS BY JOSEPH MAZZINI (Thomas Okey trans., 1894); 3
JOHN STUART MILL, A Few Words on Non-intervention, in DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
238-63 (1873).
9 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 5-8.
10 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1947); LASSA
OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 17-18 (1 st ed. 1905) (discussing the legit-
imism of the European powers during the post-Napoleonic era, with the possible excep-
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of foreigners was a matter of international concern only insofar
as those foreigners were subjects of another recognized state."
The odd consequence of this conception of international soci-
ety was that the principle of non-intervention prevented England
from helping Hungarians revolt against their Hapsburg masters,
but did not restrain England from conquering Africa. Unalloyed
with principles of popular sovereignty and national separatism,
the principle of state autonomy paradoxically authorized imperi-
alism. Among the world powers only the United States, bent on
securing its own hemisphere of influence while forcing open the
door to Asian markets, dissented from this view of international
society as an exclusive club. 12 Inter-American relations, where
rhetorical deference to the sometimes incompatible values of
non-intervention and democratic legitimacy became customary,
provided the legal origins of self-determination.' 3
At the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson urged the prin-
ciple of self-determination upon the remnants of the European
Concert. Yet the idea won grudging acceptance at Versailles
only as a principle of statecraft, rather than justice.'4 Having en-
couraged nationalist rebellion in Hapsburg and Ottoman terri-
tory in the latter stages of the war, the Allies were dragged along
by their own propaganda.' 5 In addition, the political separation
of ethnic minorities struck the victors as a prudent method of
dismembering the European territories of the vanquished.
Implementing this policy did not entail accepting self-deter-
mination as a legal obligation of general application. 16 The allied
victors did not apply it in Africa or Asia, or against themselves in
tion of England), 38-39 (discussing the dominance of the constitutive view of state
recognition during the nineteenth century).
I I An early exception to this overall pattern was the decision at the Concert of Paris
in 1856 to determine the fate of Moldavia and Wallachia by plebiscite. This decision
anticipated the later use of the self-determination principle at Versailles to dismember
defeated empires. See COBBAN, supra note 1, at 6. International intervention in the Otto-
man Empire's Balkan revolts further disrupted the pattern, leading to the breakup of the
European Concert system and the onset of World War I. See id. at 16-34.
12 See L. THOMAS GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES 17-27 (1978); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 10, at 18-23.
13 See James Brown Scott et al., Editorial Comment: President Wilson and Latin America, 7
AM.J. INT'L L. 329 (1913).
14 COBBAN, supra note 1, at 27-34.
15 Id. at 11-15.
16 See id. at 22; Woodrow Wilson, Speech of September 17, 1919, in 2 WOODROW
WILSON, WAR AND PEACE: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PAPERS (1917-1923)
244 (Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd eds., 1927); Michla Pomerance, The United States
and Self-determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9, 12
(1976).
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Europe.' 7 Even Wilson himself may have seen Balkanization
more as a means of making the world safe for democracy than as
a conception of democracy.' 8 Cynics might say that in shrinking
Balkan minorities down to manageable size,' 9 the Allies intended
only that their persecution proceed peacefully, without provok-
ing international conflict. 2° And even this hope proved vain as
German irredentism, ironically legitimated by Wilsonian rheto-
ric, dragged Europe back into war.
From the outset, critics contended that Wilson's slogan was
fatally ambiguous and that by encouraging unrealistic nationalist
aspirations, it would provoke violent conflict. In the midst of the
Paris Peace Conference, Secretary of State Robert Lansing won-
dered, "When the President talks of 'self-determination' what
unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area or a
community? Without a definite unit which is practical, applica-
tion of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability."'2 1
By the end of World War II, Lansing's view had prevailed
among Western diplomats and political theorists. At war's end
Alfred Cobban concluded that
[i]f self-determination received only a limited application
in the [Versailles] peace treaties, it is possible that this was
not primarily because of the insincerity or ill-will of the
representatives of the chief powers concerned ... but be-
cause in the nature of things it could not be applied con-
sistently .... The attempt to make the culturally united
nation-state the one and only basis of legitimate political
organization has proved untenable in practice. It was
never tenable in theory.22
In hindsight, Wilson's recklessly vague formulation seemed
like the first step down the slippery slope from Versailles to Mu-
17 COBBAN, supra note 1, at 17-19; Pomerance, supra note 16, at 4, 25.
18 Pomerance, supra note 16, at 17-19, 22-25.
19 See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 53 (1990) ("While approximately half of the
population of Europe were 'minorities' in 1914, only one-fourth were minorities in
1919."); see also Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitariansm, and the Rights of Ethnic Mi-
norities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1219, 1220 n.6 (1990) (citing Celestine Bohlen, Ethnic
Rivalries in Eastern Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at Al).
20 Some have argued that far from improving the situation of minorities in Eastern
Europe, the creation of nationally identified states rendered the remaining minorities
even more vulnerable and isolated, thus necessitating guarantees of minority rights. See
HANNUM, supra note 19, at 55-56; RAYMOND PEARSON, NATIONAL MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, 1848-1945, at 148-49 (1983).
21 Robert Lansing, Self-determination, THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, Apr. 9, 192 1, at
6, 7 (quoting own diary).
22 COBBAN, supra note 1, at 44, 63.
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nich to Auschwitz. 23 After first encouraging self-determination,
the Allies found themselves appeasing nationalism and ultimately
acquiescing in extermination.
The postwar West's rejection of nationalism was propelled by
more than horror at Nazi atrocities, however. A worldwide mo-
bilization for war and reconstruction had frayed the boundaries
of community and nation, transforming international society into
fungible battalions of soldiers, refugees, munitions workers, and
other such objects of bureaucratic interest. After a decade of de-
voting their intellectual attention to problems of logistics, West-
ern intellectuals had come to see themselves as equally fungible
technicians. To these pragmatic problem-solvers, such formerly
fashionable ideas as cultural relativism now seemed like mush-
minded nostalgia. War had reduced cultural differences to rub-
ble, while the task of post-war reconstruction was a global one,
everywhere the same. 24 Also, where third-world intellectuals
were inclined to see Nazi genocide as an extension of imperial-
ism, 25 Western liberals-Americans in particular-identified it
with the familiar embarrassment of racial discrimination.26 Thus,
cultural valences as disparate as integration and the international
style converged to oppose Nazism to universalism rather than
pluralism on many a moral compass.
C. De-Emphasis in the United Nations Charter
That national self-determination would become a central
tenet of the international order established by the war against
socialism would have surprised that order's architects. To the
framers of the United Nations Charter, Antonio Cassese writes,
"Self-determination was [still] ... only ... a means of furthering
23 See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989).
24 See, e.g., ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM
VERSUS RELATIVISM 67 (1990) (discussing association of cultural relativism with Nazism,
or tolerance of Nazism); GARRY WILLS, NIXON AGONISTES 520-22 (1971) (pragmatic ori-
entation of postwar American intellectuals). Consistent with this story about the cultur-
ally homogenizing effects of mobilization for war, Kymlicka notes a less principled
motive for the postwar reaction against group rights: a sense that distinctive national
minorities were potential pockets of irredentist disloyalty. KYMLICKA, supra note 23, at
213. On this view, the postwar hostility towards recognition of minority rights sprung
from the same cultural forces as the wartime internment-and worse-of minority
groups. The suppression of minority cultures is always ambiguous between universalist
and nationalist motivations, which is another way of saying that universalistic ideologies
are often nothing more than self-deluded cultural imperialism.
25 See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1360-62 (1989).
26 See KYMLICKA, supra note 23, at 4, 141-46, 214.
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the development of friendly relations among states and . ..
strengthen[ing] universal peace . . . with the obvious conse-
quence that it might and indeed should be set aside when its ful-
fillment would give rise to tension and conflict among states."27
The scheme established by the UN Charter for the "progres-
sive development" of "self-government" in the colonies28 did
not so much dictate their independence as legitimate their con-
tinued dependence. By characterizing colonial rule as a neces-
sary means to development for the colonies, the UN Charter
obscured the fact that such rule was an impediment to self-gov-
ernment.29 Yehuda Blum has aptly concluded that "self-determi-
nation, in contrast to sovereignty ... was not originally perceived
as an operative principle of the Charter. It was regarded as a goal
to be attained at some indeterminate date in the future." 30
Although traditionally more enamored of the principle of
self-determination than its new Western allies,3 ' the Soviet
Union agreed that self-determination was a principle of order
rather than justice. For the oft-invaded Soviet Union, self-deter-
mination meant non-intervention-in other words, respect for
the very state sovereignty challenged by demands for decoloniza-
tion or secession. 3 2
Among the victorious Allies, Britain and France retained a
vested interest in the legitimacy of empire. And while the United
States and the Soviet Union both originated as revolutionary
states, each was strongly committed to a universalist ideology
27 Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 83, 84 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977).
28 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73(b), 76(b). Under article 73(e), members were left on
their own to designate territories as non-self-governing by reporting on their status to
the Secretary-General. Under article 77, League of Nations mandates, territory taken
from World War II losers, and territory voluntarily ceded by member states could be
held in trust by willing states, subject to conditions approved by the General Assembly.
See WILSON, supra note 1, at 59-60.
29 See Lisa Stearns, The Dilemma of Struggle Through the International Order, 11 INT'LJ.
Soc. L. 65 (1983).
30 Yehuda Z. Blum, Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-determination, 10 ISR. L.
REV. 509, 511 (1975).
31 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 131 (1986);
ARNO J. MAYER, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY, 1917-1918, at 75 (1959);
Daniel Thuerer, Self-determination, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 470, 470 (1987). Re-
garding the complex ambivalence toward national self-determination in the rhetoric and
practice of Communist parties, see generally WALKER CONNOR, THE NATIONAL QUESTION
IN MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY AND STRATEGY (1984).
32 CASSESE, supra note 31, at 302. The Soviet conception of non-intervention ironi-
cally entailed that revolutions within the Soviet bloc could be brutally suppressed in
1956 (Hungary) and 1968 (Czechoslovakia) without the danger of Western intercession
on behalf of the revolutionaries.
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prescribing a single path towards modernization. Neither placed
a great value on preserving cultural particularity; neither sup-
ported Wilsonian nationalism.
It was, of course, the post-colonial states themselves that
sought and eventually won recognition of a right to self-determi-
nation. But in the end, they no more embraced the Wilsonian
principle than had the colonial powers they fought against. The
third world's surprising ambivalence toward the nationalist com-
ponent of self-determination is explained by the inherent contra-
dictions of the decolonization process.
D. The Paradox of Decolonization
If the internationalization of social and economic life under-
mined nationalist sentiment in the first world, 3 it had the oppo-
site effect on the third world. Put bluntly, third world
nationalism was engendered by Western imperialism. This is
true not just in the obvious sense that oppression provokes
resistance,3" but in the deeper sense that nationality itself was a
European export. The concept of the nation-state arose in Eu-
rope and only became meaningful in Africa and Asia in the con-
text of colonial rule. Thus, in criticizing colonial rule as alien,
third world elites ironically deployed a nationalist ideology more
European than indigenous.
Nationality is frequently ascribed on the basis of shared cul-
tural identity, 35 yet the self-conscious identification with a culture
characteristic of nationalist movements seems necessary and de-
sirable only under the social and political conditions associated
with modernity. As Ernest Gellner puts it:
[W]hen general social conditions make for standardized,
homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervad-
ing entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situa-
tion arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned
and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of
unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify.
The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of
political legitimacy.36
By inculcating a single language and literature and sweeping
33 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
34 GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 295 (T.M. Knox trans., 1958); Dov
RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 53-70 (1979).
35 See, e.g., ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 7 (1983).
36 Id. at 55.
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away traditional communal structures, the modern administrative
state creates a national culture. The very notion of a culture,
bounded, unified, and encapsulated in the canonical works of a
Balzac or a Hugo, developed alongside nationalism in nine-
teenth-century Europe. 7
Thus, the efforts of European anthropologists and philolo-
gists to export this inherently modern object of study to tradi-
tional societies proved problematic. James Clifford writes that
[a]nthropological culture collectors have typically gath-
ered what seems "traditional"-what by definition is op-
posed to modernity .... What is hybrid or "historical" in
an emergent sense has been less commonly collected and
presented as a system of authenticity. . . . [Margaret]
Mead found Arapesh receptivity to outside influences "an-
noying." Their culture collecting complicated hers. 8
Stalking for trophies in the jungles of Africa and Melanesia, Wes-
terners recognized culture as authentically traditional only when
resembling the seamless cultures promulgated by the modern
state. Crumbling before the vanguards of modernity, the fragile
societies of the third world seemed to their invaders to have no
cultures of their own. Against this background, the claims of
third world nationalists to cultural authenticity are best under-
stood as demands for Western recognition of their competence
to administer states.
How did nationalist movements arise in the developing
world? Nationalist ideology typically arises during the state-
building process as a mechanism of adjustment between three
forces: bureaucracy, traditional elites, and popular masses. In
the third world, decolonization was the consequence, not the
cause, of state-building. In some cases, the state-building pro-
cess began with European contact: The slave-trade has some-
times been depicted as having a royalizing effect on West African
politics. 3 9 In other cases, state-building commenced later in the
process of colonization. European powers initially established
territorial authority over much of Africa by co-opting traditional
elites rather than claiming sovereignty. The resulting feudal re-
gimes were transformed into states only when external pressures
in the form of military and commercial competition from rival
37 For the classic development of this argument, see RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE
AND SOCIETY, 1780-1950 (1960).
38 JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 231-32 (1988).
39 BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY: THEMES & OUTLINES 184, 186 (1974); BASIL
DAVIDSON, THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 46-48, 105 (1980).
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colonial powers forced territorial authorities into a direct admin-
istrative role.4 °
The roots of European administrative control of Africa there-
fore lie in the collapse of economic liberalism in Europe.4 ' By
the last third of the nineteenth century, economic liberalism was
besieged on two fronts. The new nation-states of Italy and Ger-
many challenged the English-dominated regime of free trade,
even as an increasingly organized working class imposed social
welfare responsibilities on all the states of Western Europe.42
The result was intensified competition for colonial resources.
These resources could only be legally protected from rivals by
the establishment of direct administration with all the attributes
of sovereignty. This caused the "scramble for Africa" in the last
two decades of the nineteenth century.43
As colonial powers strove to administer Africa, they fre-
quently undermined the authority of the traditional elites on
whom they had relied for control, even as they recruited some
elite members into the lower tiers of the administrative bureau-
cracy. As members of traditional elites found their local author-
ity fading and their new imperial careers constrained by their
colonial origins, conditions ripened for the development of na-
tionalist ideologies. 44 A unifying nationalist ideology could en-
able diverse and rival local elites to cooperate in claiming
support from equally diverse mass constituencies.4 5 Yet, nation-
alism legitimated the authority of local elites not over traditional
networks of social control, but over the state apparatuses within
which members of these elites had already begun to function.
Ironically, nationalist competition in Europe engendered na-
40 JOHN BREUILLY, NATIONALISM AND THE STATE 128 (1982).
41 The inherent contradictions and collapse of European economic liberalism are
set forth in KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 135-219 (1957).
42 BREUILLY, supra note 40, at 378.
43 Id. at 128.
44 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 86-88, 105-22 (1983).
45 For a description of the state apparatus seized by local revolutionaries, see Pros-
ser Gifford & William Roger Louis, Introduction to DECOLONIZATION AND AFRICAN INDE-
PENDENCE: THE TRANSFERS OF POWER, 1960-1980, at xi (Prosser Gifford & William
Roger Louis eds., 1988):
The African states at the time of independence inherited: international bound-
aries, military and police forces that could, with varying degrees of efficiency,
hold the state together; a revenue system based on agricultural products and
raw materials, the external value of which would fluctuate with the world mar-
ket; in the British and French cases, either elected local legislatures or elected
representatives in a metropolitan parliament; and, usually, a network of gov-
ernment offices complete with files, typewriters, and telephones.
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tionalist movements in the third world a generation or two later,
just as nationalism was being repudiated in Europe. Also ironi-
cally, third world nationalism was everywhere nurtured by the in-
tensification of Western intervention. It reflected the struggle of
newly westernized elites for control of institutions of Western or-
igin-a struggle that succeeded only when the European nation-
states became too weak to hold onto their administrative extremi-
ties. The national identities so constructed were often shaped by
the arbitrary boundaries of colonial administrative units. Thus
despite their rhetoric of cultural authenticity, nationalist move-
ments were useful in state-building precisely because they sup-
pressed or amalgamated indigenous cultural identities.46
In sum, decolonization is properly seen as an extension of the
state-building process initiated by the colonial powers-a sort of
metastasis of modernity making all societies more alike.47
E. The Emergence of a Retroactive Right to Decolonization
Seeing decolonization as an integrative rather than a disinte-
grative process helps us understand the simultaneous emergence
of a legal right to self-determination of peoples and the dwin-
dling of its nationalist component.
The legal stature of the principle of self-determination of
peoples grew with the representation of post-colonial states in
the UN General Assembly. In 1960, a year in which 17 new states
joined the United Nations, the General Assembly passed its first
resolutions recognizing a right of all peoples to self-determina-
tion48 and ascribing such a right to the residents of French Alge-
ria.49 In 1966 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights aroused controversy by attributing a right of self-determi-
46 Cf GELLNER, supra note 35, at 9-12, 32-40, 46 (discussing the transformation of
nationalism into class struggle during the Industrial Revolution).
47 As John Breuilly comments:
When the nationalist movement has organised itself through as much as against
the institutions of the colonial state and is concerned to take power at the terri-
torial level ... the idea of the future state resembles a democratised version of
the colonial state itself. Such an idea is also, of course, appropriate to legi-
timise the nationalist claim to power in terms acceptable to the imperial power
and other western powers for whom the democratic nation-state represents the
ideal and normal unit of political community.
BREUILLY, supra note 40, at 192.
48 G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
49 G.A. Res. 1573, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
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nation to all peoples. 50 The United States and the remaining co-
lonial powers continued to deny the existence of any such right
until 1970, when they participated in the General Assembly's
passage by consensus of the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States ("Declaration on Friendly Relations" or "Declara-
tion"). 5' The Declaration on Friendly Relations, defining the
right of self-determination, is generally viewed as an authorita-
tive interpretation of the UN Charter.5 2
This universal support for a right of self-determination was
achieved by restriction of the right to the decolonization context.
The progress of decolonization itself enabled this simultane-
ous enactment and attenuation of the right of self-determination.
By 1970, decolonization was substantially complete, and the
West became more interested in nurturing neo-colonial relation-
ships with the new states than in retaining colonies. With the
achievement of state power, the interests of post-colonial nation-
50 G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,.21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). For the controversy, see Franck, supra note 3.
51 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations or Declaration].
52 See CASSESE, supra note 31, at 126-65 (1986) (deriving a regime of "fundamental
principles governing international relations" from the Declaration). The Declaration
was the culmination of a lengthy effort to legitimate the U.N. Charter for its newer signa-
tories in the developing world who took no part in its drafting. The Declaration was
drafted by a committee appointed to develop an official interpretation on which the new
as well as the old members could agree. Id. at 128.
The internal evidence of the Declaration's authoritative character includes (a) the
resolution's self-description as a "Declaration" in its title; (b) the resolution's "declara-
tion" that "[tihe principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration consti-
tute basic principles of international law," Declaration, supra note 51, at 124; (c) the
reference in the resolution's title to U.N. Charter article 1 ("Friendly Relations") and in
its first paragraph to the "Principles" of the United Nations listed in U.N. Charter article
2; (d) the observation in the Declaration's preamble that "progressive development and
codification" of those principles would "promote the realization of the purposes of the
United Nations," id. at 122; and (e) the implicit reference in this preamble to U.N. Char-
ter article 13, conferring on the General Assembly authority to "encourag[e] the pro-
gressive development of international law and its codification." U.N. CHARTER art. 13.
The external evidence for the authority of the Declaration would include the Decla-
ration's adoption by consensus, combined with two customary canons of construction.
The first is that in treaty interpretation, "There shall be taken into account, together
with the context ... any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions," and "any subsequent prac-
tice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 31(3)(a)-(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39.27. The second is the custom of reading consti-
tutional texts as necessarily conferring on the institutions they establish authority to "in-
terpret their own constitutional powers and the specific provisions" of the text so
constituting them. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4 (1963).
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alists had shifted as well. Once bent on undermining the "terri-
torial integrity and political unity" of colonial empires in the
name of nationalism, the post-colonial nationalists now faced
separatist challenges of their own.53
To these precarious regimes, the United States and the
United Kingdom now offered support against secessionist claims.
But the price of Anglo-American legitimation would be accept-
ance of Anglo-American criteria of legitimacy. In acceding to the
West's equation of self-determination with liberal democracy, the
post-colonial states would paradoxically .condition their own self-
determination on compliance with Western standards of govern-
ance. 4 This was the compromise that enabled the unanimous
passage of the Declaration.
Never quite acknowledging a universal right of self-determi-
nation, the Declaration instead proclaimed that "by virtue of the
principle of... self-determination of peoples.., all peoples have
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status." 55
What groups counted as peoples? The Declaration treated
non-self-governing territories as separate territorial units, whose
residents would have a full-fledged "right of self-determination."
For the free determination of their "political status," the Declara-
tion contemplated a choice among independence from, absorp-
53 BREUILLY, supra note 40, at 222-33 (post-colonial states engender new
nationalisms).
54 For the Western bargaining position, see the U.S. and British proposals for in-
clusion in the Declaration of an equating of self-determination with a "representative
government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory."
The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples, proposal submitted to the Spe-
cial Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125.L32 (1966); see UNITED NATIONS,
DRAFT REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CON-
CERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/
L.75 (1969); LEE BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 92-93,
118-21 (1978); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 38-39 (1982).
This formula would have protected any colonial powers who might seek to annex
colonial territories and absorb colonial populations on a representative basis. At the
same time, it threatened nonrepresentative post-colonial governments with internal se-
cession and external intervention.
The United States took a similar position in the Group on Indigenous Populations
of the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities, arguing both that distinct indigenous populations could be found in post-colo-
nial states and that its own Native American tribes were too well integrated and
represented to be recognized as "peoples" with a right of self-determination. See Russel
Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 369 (1986).
55 Declaration, supra note 51, at 124 (emphasis added).
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tion by, or association with an existing state.
Regarding secession, the Declaration offered a concluding as-
surance that
[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dis-
member or impair ... the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of . . .self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus pos-
sessed of a government representing the whole people be-
longing to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour.57
Note how far this supposed triumph of post-colonial national-
ism departed from Wilsonian ideals. Thus the Declaration recog-
nized a right of secession not for peoples at all, but for those
territories that happened to be recognized by the United Nations
as colonies. This interpretation of the right of self-determination
was subsequently confirmed by the International Court ofJustice
decisions in the Namibia and Western Sahara cases 58 and by the
General Assembly's and Security Council's disapproval of Ben-
gali secession. 59 This formula, however, completely ignores the
United Nations' neo-Wilsonian practices of partitioning such cul-
turally divided colonies as India and Palestine 60 and absorbing
56 Id.
57 Id. The exclusion of any general right of secession in the Declaration is also
implied by the otherwise mysterious claim that the historically controversial principle of
self-determination of peoples advances harmonious relations among states. Id.; see Hkc-
TOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NA-
TIONS RESOLUTIONS, 89, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No.
E.79.XIV.5 (1980) (outside of colonial contexts, "[w]here the territorial integrity of the
State is involved, the right to self-determination does not in principle apply") (citation
omitted); HANNUM, supra note 19, at 49 ("[T]he international community recognizes only
a very limited right to (1) external self-determination, defined as the right to freedom
from a former colonial power, and (2) internal self-determination, defined as the inde-
pendence of the whole state's population from foreign intervention or influence."); HIG-
GINS, supra note 52, at 104 ("Self-determination refers to the right of the majority within
a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power."); cf. Marc Weller, The Inter-
national Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 569 (1992) (detailing recent departures from the traditional reluctance to recognize
secessionist movements prior to their military success).
58 Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (October 16); Advisory Opin-
ion, Namibia (S.W. Africa), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
59 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN, 1971, at
76-96 (1972), quoted in RICHARD LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAw, POLICY AND PRACTICE 568, 572 (2d ed. 1991).
60 See HANNUM, supra note 19, at 36 (discussing U.N. recognition of the partitions of
British India, Ruanda-Urundi, the Northern Cameroons, and Gilbert and Ellice Islands);
G.A. Res. 181(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 131 (1948) (concerning partition of Palestine).
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colonies such as Goa into supposedly consanguineous states.6 '
Outside the non-self-governing territories, the Declaration rec-
ognized self-determination merely as a principle rather than a
right. The residual principle, moreover, embodied nothing more
than the universalist goals of majority rule and nondiscrimina-
tion62 already enunciated by human rights law.63 Beyond the
decolonization context, then, the Declaration completely ab-
sorbed the nationalist component of self-determination into the
sovereignty of existing states.
But should we at least see the Declaration's endorsement of
decolonization as a vestige of nationalism? No. By reducing the
principle of self-determination of peoples to the political and civil
rights of individuals, the Declaration permitted the inference that
even decolonization was a right only in so far as it was instrumen-
tal in securing individual political and civil rights. If even
decolonization is interpreted as a means of enforcing universal
human rights rather than local self-rule, the nationalist compo-
nent of self-determination diminishes to nothing.64
61 HANNUM, supra note 19, at 37 (discussing U.N. acquiescence in absorption by
India of Goa, certain French enclaves, Hyderabad, and Sikkim; by Dahomey of Sao Joao
Batista de Ajuda; by Indonesia of West Irian and East Timor; and by China of Macao
and Hong Kong-all without meaningful consultation of the affected populations).
62 This was the understanding of self-determination urged by the Americans and
the British. See supra note 54. There is some controversy as to how clearly the text
embodies this view. Compare Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. PAPERS & PROC. 713,
732 (1971) (Western view prevailed) with POMERANCE, supra note 54, at 39 (arguing that
the text includes only nondiscrimination and not majority rule in the principle of self-
determination, since "representing the whole people ... without distinction as to race,''
Declaration, supra note 51, at 124, might mean representing no race less than any other).
63 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55(c); African Charter on Human and People's
Rights,June 27, 1981, arts. 2, 13, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 59, 60, 61 (1981); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
arts. 2, 23, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 2, 8, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/16, reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
673, 676, 682 (1970); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination, Mar. 12, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 50, arts. 14, 24-26; European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, March 20, .1952, art. 14, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, 232; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 7, 21,
U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71, 73, 75 (1948); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, arts. II, XX, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948); O.A.S. CHARTER, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 5, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 2418, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 52.
64 One irony is that in the nineteenth century, human rights claims were often seen
as reducible to the self-determination of peoples rather than the reverse. Thus one pub-
licist argued that humanitarian intervention was justifiable only "in behalf of a
grievously oppressed people, which has never amalgamated with its oppressors as one
nation, and which its oppressors have systematically treated as an alien race." LILLICH,
supra note 59, at 580 (citation omitted). Thus, whether rule was foreign was a condition
for making oppressive rule a matter of international concern.
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F. The Indeterminacy of Wilsonian Self-Determination
The appeal of this reduction of national self-determination to
individual human rights results from the frustrating elusiveness
of the idea of local self-rule. We can't favor indigenous over for-
eign rule unless we can distinguish the indigenous from the for-
eign. Yet universalist critics of self-determination have long
denied that this can be done. According to Cobban, "[t]he fun-
damental weakness of Wilson's ideas was his failure to realize
how indeterminate a criterion nationality might be, and how little
assistance it might sometimes give in deciding actual frontiers. "65
The Wilsonian principle of conforming political boundaries to
nationality suffers from at least three types of indeterminacy,
which I will call geographic contingency, demographic contingency, and
cultural contingency.
By geographic contingency, I mean the frustrating fact that rival
ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups are often so intermingled
that no border can be drawn between them without leaving mi-
nority enclaves.66 And once we acknowledge that nationalities
are never geographically discrete, the Wilsonian principle gives
us no criteria for deciding what territory to allocate to which na-
tionality. We want to draw boundaries on the basis of the geo-
graphic distribution of nationalities, but we cannot decide which
nationality has a majority in a given territory without already
knowing its boundaries. Which religious group has a rightful
claim to Catholic Derry, in Protestant Ulster, on Catholic Ireland,
in the Protestant British Isles? 67
Even if we know which territory we are talking about, our ef-
forts to identify it with a nationality may be frustrated by demo-
graphic contingency, by which I mean the problem of identifying
any territory's rightful residents. Since decisions about where to
reside are contingent on international boundaries and govern-
ment policies, we cannot justify boundaries on the basis of
residence.
65 COBBAN, supra note 1, at 21.
66 Whether they leave or stay, these minorities may face humanitarian risks. "Popu-
lation exchanges" are rarely peaceful or costless to the refugees, as is testified by the
casualties of the Indian-Pakistani separation, the current victims of "ethnic cleansing" in
Bosnia, the Asians who were stripped of all property in the course of expulsion from
Uganda in the 1970's, or the still liminal status of many Palestinian refugees. Concern-
ing the heightened risks faced by smaller minorities in new nation-states, see supra note
20.
67 See POMERANCE, supra note 54, at 29 (reviewing 16 examples of geographic con-
tingency in identification of the appropriate self-determination unit).
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Consider the intertwined problems of defining Palestine and
the Palestinians. 68 According to the Palestinian National Char-
ter, Palestine consists of the territory between the Jordan River
and the Mediterranean Sea. Its residents include all Arabs resid-
ing therein before 1948 and their descendants and descendants
of only those Jewish residents who preceded "the Zionist inva-
sion."'69 For many international lawyers, Palestine is now the Oc-
cupied Territories, and Palestinians are its current Arab, but not
Jewish, residents.7" To the Israeli government, Jordan is the Pal-
estinian Arab state, and the Arab residents of the West Bank and
perhaps Gaza remain Jordanian, but their land does not.7'
Who should have a hand in the future of a territory depends
not on who resides there but on who should reside there. Yet
there can never be any satisfactory answer to this question.
Thus, demographic contingency arises ultimately from the fact
that international law forbids the acquisition of territory by con-
quest, the colonization of territory by occupiers, and the expul-
sion of the occupied.72 Once conceding that territories can be
wrongfully populated by their governments, the Wilsonian prin-
ciple slides into an infinite regress. The true residents of any ter-
ritory are those who would now reside there had its true
residents always ruled there. The question remains, "Who are
these true residents?" Making matters worse, "wrongful" resi-
dence is the rule rather than the exception. Almost every popu-
68 See M.C. Bassiouni, 'Self-determination'and the Palestinians, 65 AM.J. INT'L L. PAPERS
& PROC. 31 (1971);Julius Stone, Peace and the Palestinians, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 247
(1970).
69 PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER arts. 2, 6, 20, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT:
READINGS AND DOCUMENTS 1086, 1086, 1089 (John N, Moore ed., 1977).
70 See Richard Falk, Some Legal Reflections on Prolonged Israeli Occupation of Gaza and the
West Bank, 2 J. REFUGEE STUD. 40 (1989); Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The
Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 76-79 (1990). Most interna-
tional lawyers would exclude the Jewish settlers from the self-determination formula
because the fourth Geneva Convention forbids the transfer by an occupying power of
"parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 318. See Roberts, supra, at 84-85.
71 See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968) for the original expression of the view that Gaza and
the West Bank were never legally held by Egypt and Jordan, respectively. For a more
contemporary variant of this view, see Malvina Halberstam, Self-Determination in the Arab-
Israeli Conflict: Meaning, Myth, and Politics, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 465 (1989).
72 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 (acquisition of territory by conquest); G.A. Res. 2131,
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) (non-interven-
tion in the "domestic affairs" of states); supra note 70 (regarding colonization and
expulsion).
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lated spot on the earth has been conquered, and we will find
colonists and refugees wherever we look.
Finally, even presuming that we can identify the residents of a
particular territory, we will have trouble assigning them a nation-
ality because of the problem of cultural contingency. By cultural
contingency I mean the dependence of cultural identity on polit-
ical boundaries and governing institutions. We have seen that
national identity is an artifact-the deliberate creation of political
activists bent on mobilizing popular support. Because nationalist
movements are typically directed toward seizing an existing state
apparatus, the boundaries of nationality tend to be coextensive
with political boundaries. Accordingly, as Ernest Gellner writes,
"nations are not inscribed into the nature of things, they do not
constitute a political version of the doctrine of natural kinds."7 "
The nation, concludes Benedict Anderson, is "an imagined polit-
ical community, ' 74 and "nationalism," quips Gellner, "invents
nations where they do not exist." 75
If, as these observers claim, national identity is invented and
imposed by states, nationality depends on political boundaries.
If nationality depends on political boundaries, however, we can't
justify those boundaries by reference to the geographic distribu-
tion of nationality.
But can we accept the premise of cultural contingency-that
cultural identification with a nation depends upon political
boundaries? How, if the boundaries of nationality and state are
generally coextensive, do secession disputes arise? I think we
can account for secessionist movements if we remember two
points. First, states are internally articulated. "Political bounda-
ries" include the boundaries of the innumerable administrative
units within states as well as the boundaries between states. Sec-
ond, while national identity is a product of the modern state, cul-
ture in the broader sense of language, religion, and custom is
not. By conditioning opportunity on participation in an official
culture, however, the modern state politicizes culture. If the bru-
tal process of inculcating a national identity provokes resistance,
that resistance will almost inevitably take the form of inventing
73 GELLNER, supra note 35, at 49. Breuilly similarly concludes, "There is no 'natu-
ral' basis to politics. There is no cultural or any other non-political unit of humanity
which can be regarded as the true basis of legitimate politics." BREUILLY, supra note 40,
at 383-84.
74 ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 6.
75 ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964).
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rival national identities. To say that national identity depends on
political boundaries, then, is not to say that the building of a state
will engender only one national identity within its boundaries. 76
Given that multiple national identities may be engendered by any
state-building process, the effort to conform boundaries to ex-
isting nationalities may prove a Sisyphean task.
The contingency of cultural identity on politics in the modern
world is not just a matter of boundaries, however. Cultural iden-
tity may depend not only on the boundaries, but also on theforms
of government. Thus, the close historical association between
nationality and the modern administrative state suggests an even
deeper difficulty with the Wilsonian conception of self-determi-
nation. If nationality implies a claim to competence in adminis-
tering a modern state, it may not represent "self-determination"
for all "peoples." As we have observed, separatist movements
successfully resist the imposition of a particular nationality only
by adopting a competing one. Yet nationality, with its language
of instruction, its national gallery, its commemorative postage, its
balance of payments, is not the fate every non-Western society,
left to "itself," would choose. 77 Moreover, if nationality threat-
ens pre-modern cultures, some will worry that it may also fore-
stall the development of the postmodern cultures that might
accompany forms of governance yet undreamt of.
G. The Indeterminacy of Decolonization
The three indeterminacies of nationality seem to demand the
complete abandonment of the Wilsonian principle.
Did the General Assembly abandon Wilsonianism in the Dec-
laration on Friendly Relations? At first blush, so it appears. By
guaranteeing the territorial integrity of existing states and colo-
nies, while allowing the latter independence, the General Assem-
bly appeared to eliminate the Wilsonian problem of boundary
drawing. But in reality, the General Assembly simply displaced
Wilsonian indeterminacy onto the problem of identifying
colonies.
76 POMERANCE, supra note 54, at 3; Pleadings of Bedjaoui (Western Sahara) CR 75/
31, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings 29-30 (July 29, 1975) (self-determination disputes involve the
territorial claims of competing national identities).
77 See ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 50 (1991) (indigenous rights claims need not
take the form of statehood); HANNUM, supra note 19, at 95-96; S.James Anaya, The Capac-
ity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, 13 HUM. RTS. Q 403
(1991).
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While the Declaration identifies non-self-governing territories
as colonies, the Charter never defines non-self-governing territo-
ries. Members are only honor-bound to identify and report on
the status of any such territory they hold. Thus, we are only able
to identify as non-self-governing those territories allowed by
their rulers to gain independence under UN supervision.7" But
colonial empires cannot be thus trusted to define the scope of
decolonization. Algeria, for example, won independence without
ever winning admission from the French government that it was
not an integral part of the land of liberty, equality, and fraternity.
The Algerian right of self-determination conceded by De Gaulle
in 1959 was a right of "secession," not decolonization.79
The problem is that distinguishing between obligatory
decolonization and discretionary secession requires the same dis-
tinction between foreign and indigenous rule that got us into
trouble in the first place: As Michla Pomerance observed:
[E]very demand for self-determination is . . . based on a
subjective conviction that present rule is "alien" or "colo-
nial" ..... Little wonder, then, that all the valiant attempts
to define the term so as to . . . rule out that undesirable,
but inescapable.., synonym ... of "self-determination"-
"secession"-have landed in hopeless tautological bogs."°
To confirm this charge of circularity, let's consider some of
the criteria suggested for identifying colonial territories.
Perhaps the most obvious criterion is prior conquest by a
state.8 1 As we have seen, however, we can't categorize colonies
as conquered territory without embracing most of the globe. 2
Furthermore, the boundaries of most post-colonial states reflect
the patterns of European conquest, rather than any pre-colonial
boundaries.
A second possible index of colonial status is minority rule.83
Until very recently, however, equating colonialism with minority
rule would have been almost as encompassing, including many
78 See Franck, supra note 3, at 70-71.
79 See Keith Panter-Brick, Independence, French Style, in DECOLONIZATION AND AFRICAN
INDEPENDENCE: THE TRANSFERS OF POWER, 1960-1980, supra note 45, at 73, 74-75, 95.
80 POMERANCE, supra note 54, at 14.
81 See BUCHANAN, supra note 77, at 67-70 (discussing prior conquest as justification);
Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439, 442 (1990).
82 See supra text accompanying note 72.
83 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1760, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 38, U.N. Doc.
A/5100 (1962) (Southern Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 216, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/6921/Rev. 1 (1965); see also POMERANCE, supra note 54, at 40; WILSON, supra note 1, at
81.
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84states themselves considered "colonial" powers.
Geographic separation of a territory from the remainder of a
state is no more adequate a criterion of foreignness.8 5 Many
states (the United States for example) fully represent the resi-
dents of extra-continental or noncontiguous territory in political
decisionmaking.8 6
Ethnic or cultural distinctiveness of a territory's population also
cannot provide a reliable metric."7 Most post-colonial states con-
tain multiple ethnicities and cultures. Some of these states-Su-
dan and Indonesia come to mind-have brutally subordinated
discrete racial groups.8
Some have suggested that relative poverty of a territory or re-
gion indicates colonial status.8 9 But since development typically
exacerbates regional disparities of wealth within a country, 90 such
disparities are found throughout the developing world. a ' From
84 See U.N. Sanctions Against Rhodesia: Hearings on S. 1404 Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) (statement of Senator Byrd); POMERANCE,
supra note 54, at 40-41.
85 Cf G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1961) (discussing geographic separation as a criterion); POMERANCE, supra note
54, at 15 (discussing a "salt-water test").
86 Examples of the first category are the United States, Russia, Turkey, Greece,
Denmark, Spain, and possibly Egypt. Any country with island territory falls into the
second category.
87 See G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 85; POMERANCE, supra note 54, at 16.
88 See ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR 203-04, 247-70
(1989) (concerning Indonesia); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS, THE RETURN TO
DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN 55-63, 68 (1986) (concerning Sudan). See generally GEORGE
MONBIOT, POISONED ARROWS: AN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNEY THROUGH INDONESIA (1989)
(discussing suppression of Melanesians of Irian Jaya).
89 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/ 11963 (1974).
90 What is commonly meant by "development" is the movement from a decentral-
ized and insular agricultural economy to an urban, industrialized, and trade-oriented
economy. During the early stages of industrialization, wealth is typically concentrated in
the cities and ports. Even in South Korea, a nation that has achieved unusually equitable
economic growth through rural land reform, the disparity between rural and urban
wealth is large. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
172-76, 191-94 (1989); see also Asbjorn Eide, Maldevelopment and "The Right to Develop-
ment": A Critical Note With a Constructive Intent, in HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY WORKSHOP, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AT THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEVEL 397 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed., 1980) (national development towards
self-determination does not ensure uniformity of internal development); cf. Roland Y.
Rich, The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L. 287, 320
(1983) ("The right to development . . . would go further than the right of self-
determination.").
91 See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 26-
27 (1991) (urban-rural wealth disparities throughout developing world). According to
the report, of the countries ranking between 50th and 100th on the human development
index, 11 of 14 for which statistics were available showed more rural than urban poverty.
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the standpoint of wealth distribution, post-colonial regimes re-
semble colonial regimes.
Finally, we might be tempted to conclude'that while no single
criterion of colonial status suffices, some combination of these factors
reliably identifies those territorial units we have traditionally
viewed as colonies. The difficulty is that such combinations will
also be found in post-colonial states. East Pakistan, for example,
was noncontiguous, linguistically distinct, relatively impover-
ished, unrepresented, and joined with West Pakistan only by vir-
tue of Britain's common conquest of both regions. Nevertheless,
the transformation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh is universally
treated as secession rather than decolonization.92
Each of these factors informs our ascriptions of colonial status
because each informs our concepts of national identity and differ-
ence. If we are prepared to concede that the concept of
decolonization is parasitic on the concept of nationality, then we
cannot endorse secession by colonies without also endorsing a
general right of secession for nationalities. Conversely, if we re-
ject any such general right of national liberation as fatally inde-
terminate, we must reject the right of decolonization on the same
grounds.
H. The Reduction of Self-Determination to Individual Human Rights
In fact, nearly every contemporary English-speaking political
philosopher who has reflected upon self-determination has ar-
rived at this position.9"
These philosophers begin with a contractarian view of the
In 6 of 9 for which statistics were available, the top quintile received more than ten times
as much income as the bottom quintile. But for those countries ranking below the top
100 (that is, those countries not undergoing significant economic development), in 5 of
the 7 for which data was available, the top quintile earned less than ten times as much
income as the bottom quintile. Id. at 152-53.
92 See LILLICH, supra note 59, at 566-72. Other examples abound. The Northern
and Southern provinces of Iraq are primarily populated by distinct ethnic and religious
groups subject to discriminatory repression, who claim economic exploitation and inad-
equate representation by the government, and are included in the Iraqi state by agree-
ment of the colonial powers, without their consent. Concerning the Kurds of northern
Iraq, see HANNUM, supra note 19, at 178-81, 190-94; MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN IRAQ, at ix-xi, 25-26, 31-36, 53-64, 69-96 (1990). Concerning the Shiites of
the South, see id. at 34, 49-53, 63, 64; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 149 (1992).
Tibet is another example meeting multiple criteria. See HANNUM, supra note 19, at 423-
26.
93 But see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE 31-63 (1983); Michael Walzer, The
Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 217 (Charles
R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985); Michael Walzer, The Rights of Political Communities, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ETHICS, supra, at 165.
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state as an instrument for protection of pre-political entitle-
ments. Fernando Tes6n's premise, that "the ultimate justifica-
tion of the existence of states is the protection and enforcement
of the natural rights of the citizens," is typical.94 From the same
premise, Jack Donnelly concludes that "the right to self-determi-
nation . . . involves respecting the other human rights . . . . If
these rights are fully respected, it is difficult to see how the right
to self-determination could be denied. ' 9 5
If the self-determination of peoples is synonymous with the
human rights of individuals, then secession is only a remedy of
last resort for the violation of individual rights, especially rights
against discrimination. Allen Buchanan, for example, regrets
that "[u]nder certain conditions" secession "may be the only
practical way for a group to protect itself from ... literal geno-
cide, or ... ethnic discrimination. ' 96
Charles Beitz forthrightly follows out the implications of this
view for decolonization. Beitz asks us to imagine that
Country A is an imperial country, and area B, a territori-
ally distinct area with generally accepted boundaries, is A's
colony. Since A is the most benevolent of all possible im-
perial countries, there is no reason to think that granting
independence to B will decrease the amount of social in-
justice in B; indeed, the opposite seems more likely ....
Nonetheless, the residents of B, in a fair and free election,
overwhelmingly indicate their preference for national in-
dependence. On my view of self-determination, A should
97resist ....
All states, Beitz assumes, have the same duties to their residents;
as long as these duties are met, no residents are entitled to view
their government as foreign and to establish a separate state.
94 FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 15 (1988).
95 DONNELLY, supra note 90, at 148. A more complex (some might say contradic-
tory) position is taken by Margalit and Raz. They acknowledge that individual "goals...
are . . . the creatures of society, the products of culture," and that "[g]roup interests
cannot be reduced to individual interests." Margalit & Raz, supra note 81, at 448-49.
They also concede that the prosperity of encompassing groups is intrinsically valuable.
Id. at 456 n.8. Nevertheless, they insist that the moral importance of the group's interest
depends on its value to individuals. Id. at 451.
96 BUCHANAN, supra note 77, at 50; see also HenryJ. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in
the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1557 (1991)
("Separation of ethnic communities through power-sharing arrangements, regional gov-
ernments, and personal laws may ... [sometimes] constitute a practical necessity, a 'least
worst' solution that is surely preferable to ongoing violence and systemic oppression.").
97 CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 103 (1979).
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Realizing that his hypothetical will likely raise the hackles of
his readers, Beitz hastens to add that he cannot imagine any em-
pire so benevolently protecting the human rights of its colonial
subjects.98 Unfortunately, however, empires have all too often
imagined themselves benevolent. Few colonial powers have
failed to congratulate themselves for spreading civilization and
the rule of law, whether by enslaving the locals or stopping the
locals from enslaving one another.99 That some measure of
human rights violation is probably inevitable in the early stages
of development' makes this "white man's burden" easy to as-
sume. To the extent that the human rights records of developing
societies prove imperfect, Beitz's conception of self-determina-
tion invites foreign rulers to do better. And when they inevitably
fail, Beitz's standard leaves them little for which to apologize.
From the standpoint of human rights, Europeans arguably ruled
the peoples of the developing world no less justly than indige-
nous rulers would have during the same era. However, to sup-
port independence only as a last resort remedy for injustice is to
deny that foreign rule is intrinsically unjust.
International lawyers and philosophers claim to support self-
determination of peoples. But once we read the fine print, the
qualifications and conditions, that support turns out to be sur-
prisingly weak. International lawyers recognize a right of inde-
pendence only for colonies. Philosophers, rigorously observing
that decolonization is indistinguishable from secession, reject the
right of any people to independence. Hence, the group self-de-
termination endorsed by both international lawyers and philoso-
phers is reducible to the political and civil rights of individuals.
Thus reduced, the self-determination of peoples retains no na-
tionalist element at all.
III. A DEFENSE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
I will defend what I have called the nationalist component of
self-determination-the right of groups to some form of auton-
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., DAVID B. DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS (1984); ROBERT A. WIL-
LIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990). Even the U.N. Charter authorized colonial rule in the interest of
preparing developing societies for self-government. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73(b), 76(b).
In fairness to Beitz, he is aware of this problem. BEITZ, supra note 97, at 99.
100 DONNELLY, supra note 90, at 187-94 (inevitability of political and civil rights viola-
tions in first stage of modernization).
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omy-by attacking the reduction of self-determination to the
rights of individuals.
This reductive view of self-determination, I will contend, is a
form of moral myopia, involving a sociologically naive reduction
of morality to justice. Proponents of the reductive view have em-
braced a variant ofJohn Rawls' influential definition of liberalism
as "the priority of the right over the good." 10' In their view, our
moral obligations to one another are pretty much exhausted once
we have each have got our rights, our share of "manna," as one
liberal political theorist puts it.' 0 2 This leaves us free autono-
mously to choose and pursue our own ends.
Yet it is a mistake to suppose that people either choose or
pursue their vision of the good autonomously. They do not so
much choose ends as choose cultural identities through which
they can participate in collective decision and action. Thus, they
forgo the autonomy celebrated by philosophers in order to gain
access to one another's powers and judgment. They do this be-
cause the pursuit of genuinely private ends would be emotionally
meaningless and politically ineffectual.
Rather than reduce morality to justice, we should view moral-
ity as a form of politics in which each person's ability to identify
and pursue worthy goals depends on the cooperation of others.
From this view it follows that only when we act together can we
be the self-determining moral agents philosophers describe.
My argument against reducing group self-determination
claims to instruments for the protection of individual autonomy
will proceed in three steps. First, I will show that one important
benefit of group autonomy, the protection of distinctive cultures,
must be seen as a collective good, not just a benefit to individuals.
Second, I will argue that devotion to any moral end gives us rea-
son to create a distinctive culture and embody it in an autono-
mous political institution. It follows that respecting the moral
autonomy of individuals entails respecting the autonomy of the
groups through which they pursue their moral ends. Third, I will
show how this argument for group autonomy integrates the uni-
versalist and nationalist components of self-determination. On
the one hand, building and sustaining democracy requires the
101 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 31 (1971).
102 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 31 (1980). Note,
however, that (1) for Ackerman the distribution of manna is not exhaustive of all distrib-
utive questions, id. at 67-68, and (2) Ackerman acknowledges reasons to distribute
manna to groups, though to achieve justice for individuals. Id. at 64-66.
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nurturing of a distinctive culture. On the other hand, groups
best realize the moral autonomy of individuals if they are demo-
cratically governed.
I conclude that the original romantic ideal of self-determina-
tion rightly fused democracy with group autonomy. Democracy
depends upon group autonomy, while the autonomy rights of
groups depend upon their democracy. These two aspirations are
not, in the end, separable components of the principle of self-
determination, but inextricable skeins of a single fabric.
A. Cultural Preservation as a Collective Good
My first claim is that the reductive view cannot adequately ac-
count for the cultural claims stressed by some separatist move-
ments. Indigenous separatists, for example, want to shield
shared cultures from homogenization, not just to shield individu-
als against discrimination. Nor can we explain such demands for
cultural preservation as indirect means to the pursuit of individ-
ual ends. Cultures are not reducible to the shared backgrounds
or experience of individuals; cultures also commit individuals to
shared conceptions of the good. Since we cannot distinguish in-
dividual ends from the cultures that constitute them, we cannot
explain the value of cultures to their members by describing
them as shared resources permitting the pursuit of individual
ends. Instead we must admit that in choosing to preserve a cul-
ture, we are thereby shaping the identities and the ends of future
individuals.
How does the reductive view account for the autonomy claims
of aboriginal groups? Reductionism would lead us to expect
such separatist demands only in response to discrimination. Un-
derlying this expectation is the belief that not just group separa-
tism, but also group identity, are marks of oppression.
The emergence of this scorn for group identity is discernible
in international law's changing understanding of minority rights.
In the wake of World War I, the Allies constructed an elaborate
system of treaties for the protection of minorities in the new
states of Eastern Europe and the Near East. According to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the purposes of this
Wilsonian regime included "the grant to minorities of suitable
means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their tra-
ditions and their characteristics." 103
103 Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 11,
at 136, 140 (April 6).
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A generation later, however, the United Nations Subcommis-
sion on Minority Rights put a very different spin on the function
of such rights. Rejecting the suggestion that minority groups
were characterized by "a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their culture,"' 10 4 one Subcommission member in-
stead proposed that minority groups be defined as ethnic, reli-
gious, or linguistic minorities, having a sense of solidarity
"motivated ... by a collective will to survive and [an] aim ... to
achieve equality with the majority."' 10 5 On this view, majority dis-
crimination imposes identities on groups, while freedom for any
group means the freedom of individual members from identifica-
tion with that group.
Let us consider this reductive view of group identity as it ap-
plies to the rights of indigenous groups. In 1969, the progressive
Canadian administration of Pierre Trudeau attempted to disman-
tle Canada's Indian reservation system in the name of equal op-
portunity. Reservation lands would be individually held and
freely alienable on a nondiscriminatory basis while local govern-
ment would be elected by all residents regardless of origin. The
Canadian government deemed "the granting of permanent polit-
ical rights to a special class of citizens '' 6 incompatible with "the
fundamental right of the Indian people to full and equal partici-
pation" in Canadian public life.'0 7 But this commitment to an
"Indian-blind" Constitution reflected blindness to the aspira-
tions of actual Indians, whose protests succeeded in blocking
Trudeau's plan.'0 8
Can the reductive view account for the determination of in-
104 FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETH-
NIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 96, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.I,
U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.I (1979).
105 Jules Deschenes, Proposal Concerning a Definition of the Term "Minority, " in UNITED
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, PROMOTION, PROTECTION, AND RESTORATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS, REPORT OF
THE SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORI-
TIES 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31 & Corr. 1 (1985). Deschenes' definition was
forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, although without formal approval.
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMISSION ON
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES ON ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH
SESSION, Res. 1985/6, at 85-86, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/5 (1985). The Commission's
Working Group on Minority Rights avoided the problem of definition. See HANNUM,
supra note 19, at 61.
106 MICHAEL ASCH, HOME AND NATIVE LAND: ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION 76 (1984).
107 The Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, in RICHARD P. BOWLES ET
AL., THE INDIAN: ASSIMILATION, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? 201 (1972).
108 KYMLICKA, supra note 23, at 143-44.
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digenous peoples to share a common culture? Will Kymlicka, an
unusually sophisticated exponent of the reductive view, has re-
cently acknowledged that group autonomy claims can be moti-
vated by the desire to preserve a culture rather than avoid
discrimination. But he insists that a culture's value to a group is
exhausted by its ability to enhance the autonomy of the group's
members by informing individual choice.
For Kymlicka, "language and history are the media through
which we come to an awareness of the options available to us,
and their significance; and this is a precondition of making intelli-
gent judgments of how to lead our lives."' 0 9 Because we need a
past history to make future choices, concludes Kymlicka, "cul-
tural community . . . provid[es] a context . . . within which to
choose and pursue our conception of the good life.""'
Yet despite his talk of community, the choices that Kymlicka
thinks cultures enable are individual choices. Individuals have a
right to have a cultural past, so that they can make informed
choices of ends. But having a culture in this sense imposes no
future obligations: it enables individual choice without con-
straining it. Thus Kymlicka rigorously distinguishes the shared
history which constitutes a culture from the "shared ends which
characterize the culture at any given moment."11
By limiting his definition of culture to common history rather
than common ends, Kymlicka hopes to explain cultural preserva-
tion as a means to individual rather than group autonomy. By
thus defining all cultures as neutral with respect to ends, Kym-
licka hopes to square cultural preservation with value-neutral lib-
eralism. But three difficulties frustrate this effort.
First, Kymlicka's conception of culture as a sort of labor-sav-
ing software for individual end-choosers explains why all individ-
109 Id. at 165.
110 Id. at 172.
111 Id. (emphasis added). Margalit and Raz take two steps beyond Kymlicka. First,
they acknowledge that cultures don't simply provide contexts for individual choices of
ends, but actually supply the ends chosen. Second, they recognize that each individual's
sense of self-esteem and well-being may rise or fall with the treatment of her "encom-
passing group." In these senses, they argue, their approach is "opposed in spirit to
contractarian-individualistic approaches to politics or to individual well-being." Mar-
galit & Raz, supra note 81, at 456-57. For them, groups have "intrinsic value." But by
this they mean that groups have intrinsic value to individuals, that the interests of indi-
viduals depend on the well-being of the group. With the latter point I agree, but I
would add that groups also have an intrinsic value that transcends their utility to individ-
uals. Individuals have not just instrumental but also moral reasons for preserving their
cultural communities: Such communities are the indispensable vehicles for the fulfill-
ment of whatever they conceive their moral obligations to be.
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uals need membership in some culture, but it doesn't explain
why they need to be members of any particular culture. 1 2 Ac-
cepting Kymlicka's account of the value of cultures, Allen
Buchanan concludes that
[b]ecause the value of cultural membership is not limited
to membership in one particular culture, and because indi-
viduals whose culture is damaged will in some cases be
able to affiliate successfully with another culture ... if they
are given the resources to do so... there is, strictly speak-
ing, no right to the perpetual existence of any one particu-
lar culture. 31 3
By offering a functional defense of culture, Kymlicka makes cul-
turesfungible. Such a view has particularly ominous implications
for indigenous cultures. If cultures are simply decisionmaking
tools, we want to know which one will best facilitate choice for
the greatest number at the least cost. And if modern consumer
culture does so more efficiently than traditional Native American
culture, Kymlicka offers us no compelling reason for protecting
enclaves of Native American culture against markets and majori-
ties. The sooner modernity consumes the Indians' moribund
world, the sooner all can enjoy a future in which modern technol-
ogy will cheaply broadcast the same choice-informing culture
into every home on the globe. Treating all cultures as fungible,
Kymlicka's instrumental account of cultures justifies the assimila-
tion, not the preservation, of distinctive cultures.
Second, Kymlicka's instrumental conception of culture does
not just discourage us from preserving distinctive cultures-it
implies that there are no distinctive cultures to preserve. If any
choice I make is informed by my cultural history, and no re-
sponse to my cultural history can be inconsistent with my culture,
I perpetuate my culture no matter what choices I make. But if,
bored by the idiocy of rural life, I sell off my tribe's ancestral
lands; if, weary of religious discrimination, I raise my children in
ignorance of the faith into which I was born; if, in shame of my
heritage, Ijoin an organization devoted to its oppression and ex-
tinction, do I thereby preserve my culture? Does every reaction
to my culture, no matter how hostile, perpetuate it?
No doubt between orthodoxy and apostasy there is a contin-
uum of adaptation which the concept of cultural preservation
somewhere arbitrarily severs. But to avoid this line-drawing
112 See BUCHANAN, supra note 77, at 54.
''3 Id. at 55.
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problem by defining all cultures as value-neutral is to prevent the
drawing of lines between cultures. If cultures are indistinguish-
able, the right of cultural preservation is reduced to nonsense.
Third, Kymlicka's value-neutral notion of culture relies on an
unrealistic distinction between past traditions and future goals.
Many traditions teach us to evaluate future consequences in
terms of the preferences of ancestry rather than posterity. More-
over, as David Luban argues, even when we act consequentially,
"the consequences we seek are in large measure to be sought in
the past."'' 14
I understand Luban to be making two points. On one hand,
as Kymlicka himself acknowledges, we choose among goals de-
fined and made meaningful by tradition.' 1 5 Even in assessing the
consequences of our actions for posterity, we populate the future
with people committed to the same traditions to which we are
committed. On the other hand, in choosing a future, we also in-
terpret tradition and so choose a past. Just as we make the future
meaningful by linking it to the past, we make the past meaningful
by imagining it as the portal to a better future.
This mutual entailment of past traditions and future goals is
exemplified by a legal dispute between Cape Cod's Mashpee In-
dians and the State of Massachusetts that came to trial in 1978.116
The main issue at trial was the tribal status of the Mashpee, on
which turned their claim to tribal lands. At trial, the attorneys
and witnesses for the State of Massachusetts pointed out that the
Town of Mashpee was settled by refugees from various tribes;
that they were organized as tenants in common by a Baptist mis-
sionary; that this common land tenure, far from reflecting Indian
tradition, was characteristic of most colonial Massachusetts set-
tlements; that the Massachusetts legislature later disentailed the
Indians' common land at their own behest; that the Indians then
voluntarily and profitably sold their allotments; that there was no
record of formal tribal governance between 1870 and 1920, at
which point Indian rituals were temporarily revived for the en-
tertainment of tourists; that current plaintiffs neither looked nor
dressed like Indians; and that they had to learn about Indian tra-
ditions by traveling to western reservations or taking Native
American Studies courses in college.
114 David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152,
2221 (1989).
115 KYMLICKA, supra note 23, at 172.
116 Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978).
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Did the Mashpee abandon their culture, or did they merely
adapt it to oppressive conditions? Attorneys and witnesses for
the Mashpee claimed the latter. According to their version of
history, there was nothing inauthentic about their forming a new
community out of the remnants of other tribes. On first contact
with Europeans, America's natives had a variety of flexible polit-
ical institutions. Only the need to treat and fight with the
Europeans gradually formalized these institutions into sovereign
tribes. Mashpee's original settlers had seen their communities
wiped out by European disease. Only a minority of the town's
residents acceded to the disentailment of their land, and then
only because the state legislature insisted upon it as a condition
for enfranchising town residents. The disappearance of their tri-
bal council coincided with the period of greatest Bureau of In-
dian Affairs hostility toward the tribes. In addition, the Council
may have continued to exist without leaving formal records. In
any case, Indians retained control of the town government until
the 1960's, while their church remained a locus of political or-
ganizing and a haven for some aspects of traditional Indian wor-
ship. Finally, with the loss of control of local government in the
1970's, tribal governance reemerged.1 17
So had the Mashpee any common culture left to preserve?
James Clifford shrewdly comments:
Interpreting the direction or meaning of the historical
"record" always depends on present possibilities. When
the future is open, so is the meaning of the past. Did In-
dian religion or tribal institutions disappear in the late
nineteenth century? Or did they go underground? In a
present context of serious revival they went underground;
otherwise they disappeared.118
Whether the Mashpee are now a tribe depends on their history,
to be sure. But the content of that history depends in turn on
their present purposes.
In reducing tradition to a value-neutral, decision-making
technology, Kymlicka imagines a temporal gap between the
bonds of common culture and the contingency of individual
choice. He thereby forgets that culture, although common, is it-
self an arena of contingency. The choices that culture informs
are never merely private, because they affect the identity of every
participant in the culture. Why do participants in a culture so
117 CLIFFORD, supra note 38, at 277-346.
118 Id. at 343.
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often contest the meaning of its constitutive traditions instead of
politely agreeing to disagree about future goals? The answer lies
in the fact that by contesting a common past they are asserting
political claims over one another's powers. They refuse to sepa-
rate their individual ends from their shared history because they
refuse to separate from one another-they refuse to treat the col-
lective determination of their selves as a matter of individual
choice.
Any argument for group autonomy based on a right of cul-
tural preservation must acknowledge that cultural traditions are
not simply inherited by individuals. They are common property
that we can make use of only by invoking-or inventing -a com-
mon purpose. Cultures cannot be disentailed.
B. Morality as a Reason for Creating and Preserving Culture
My second claim is that we have the best of reasons to create
and sustain culturally bounded communities: Moral action re-
quires it. My point is not that some particularly attractive moral
view requires embodiment in a culturally bounded community;
my point is that any moral view demands this. We can only effec-
tively advance any conception of the good in a social world by
making a cause of it-that is, by consulting and cooperating with
like-motivated others. Such causes exclude the uncommitted and
entail the collective governance of some of the powers of their
members. Thus, any seriously entertained moral end is a reason
for bounding and empowering a group.
Common sense tells us that identification with others encour-
ages us to act morally. As vain as we are selfish, we are most
likely to behave morally if our obligations to others are incorpo-
rated into our sense of identity. And so we are more likely to be
motivated to act morally by internal critique, critique of our ac-
tions as unworthy of our group identity, than by critique of our
group identity as an impediment to some neutral and universal
value that has no particular claim on us." 9 People are clannish,
and moral argument ignores this truth at its peril.
Nor is this clannishness an unfortunate tendency that morality
119 See WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 313-14 (all moral reasoning is
culturally and historically embedded); Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A
Western Construct with Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979) (lack of enforcement of
human rights in third world stems from illegitimacy based on discontinuity with tradi-
tional values of rural sectors and incompatibility with interests of modern elite sectors).
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must work its way around. Morality is inherently a collective en-
terprise, and inherently intolerant.
Why is morality inherently collective? Suppose you think
yourself obliged to bring about a certain state of affairs. While
you are concerned about the consequences of your actions, those
consequences are going to depend on the actions of others. If
you can get others to commit to your moral view, and to cooper-
ate with you in planning action, you can plan more effectively
because you have more information. You can also act more effec-
tively because more people will be trying to achieve the results
you desire. Therefore, no consequentialist moral view can leave
you indifferent to the beliefs and actions of others; indeed, any
such moral view gives you compelling reasons to cooperate with
others committed to the same view. 120
Why is morality not just inherently collective, but also inher-
ently intolerant? Because the collective pursuit of a moral end is
open only to believers. Cooperators in the pursuit of a moral
end will have obligations to one another to share information
and fulfill expectations, and perhaps to accede to the majority
will about how best to pursue the mutually desired conse-
quences. These are obligations that cooperators don't have to-
wards outsiders and that outsiders don't have towards them.
Now before proceeding to the political implications of moral-
ity's inherent clannishness, I want to fend off a likely objection.
All that I have said so far applies only to consequentialist morali-
ties, those that seek to maximize some good in the world. But
proponents of the reductive view will claim to reject all such mo-
ralities as incompatible with the priority of the right over the
good. Instead, they will insist, all right-thinking people embrace
deontological moralities, which guarantee individual rights,
damn the consequences. 12 1
. The reductionists are mistaken. Their devotion to individual
rights does not and cannot make them morally indifferent to the
120 For a rigorous formulation and development of this position, see DONALD RE-
GAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 124-89, 207-10 (1980).
121 "Deontology," the Greek for "science of duty," currently refers to ethical theo-
ries holding that "at least some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their conse-
quences for human weal or woe." ROBERT G. OLSON, Deontological Ethics, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967); cf. SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE
REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (1982) (describing an ethic that under some circum-
stances permits but does not require acting without regard to consequences). Important
works in the deontological tradition include KANT, supra note 5; W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD (1930).
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consequences of their actions. Suppose your putatively deonto-
logical moral theory consists of the simple injunction, "Never
punish the innocent, no matter what the consequences." If you
mean this literally, lacking certain knowledge of guilt, you will
never punish anyone. If you think punishment is ever justified,
you mean, "Never punish anyone with less than a particular
probability of guilt, because punishing is likely to result in less
justice than not punishing."' 122 For right-thinkers, then, punish-
ment is justified by its consequences in maximizing the good of
justice. 123
The point of thus contending that right-thinkers are closet
consequentialists is not to confute them-it is to portray them as
political actors, obliged to cooperate in maximizing the good of
justice in the world. 124 On this view, if our right-thinker is op-
posed to punishing the innocent, she is obliged to do more than
avoid false witness and blame-by-association in her personal con-
duct. She is obliged to cooperate with others of like motivation
in creating and preserving fair institutions. 25
If you're persuaded that right-thinking is a collective project,
122 "[Slince any actual criminal justice system is inherently fallible, any such system
will inevitably inflict punishment on some people who are actually innocent and thus do
not deserve it." David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623,
1632 (1992). For further development of this argument, see Guyora Binder, Punishing
the Innocent Utilitarian (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the StanfordJournal
of International Law).
123 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, What May Philosophy Contribute to the Study of Law
and Society 22 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Journal ofInter-
national Law):
Even if we set ourselves against the utilitarian logic of aggregated conse-
quences or the maximization of wealth, even if we hold that no-one is to be
treated disrespectfully merely for the sake of greater prosperity or comfort for
others, we will still need consequential information to determine whether or
not any of these things are happening.
The paradox that deontology calls for rights-respect even when it leads to more rights
violation is explored in SCHEFFLER, supra note 121, at 80-114. Scheffler argues forcefully
that indifference to the consequences for rights of "right action" is primafacie irrational
and inadequately explained by deontologists. He does not argue, as I do, that such
indifference is impossible-that is, that beliefs about consequences are implicit in any
description of an action, so that any moral maxim prescribing action is consequentialist.
124 Such an interpretation of liberal rights theory as a substantive vision of the good,
rather than a neutral framework for the pursuit of contending visions of the good, has
been persuasively advanced in Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote
Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1991).
125 This argument is meta-ethical in the sense that it is a claim about moral lan-
guage. Reasoning from pragmatic notions of linguistic meaning, I am arguing first that
if acceptance of a moral claim such as "the innocent have a right against punishment"
has no consequences for action, the claim has no meaning. I am arguing, second, that
while no description of the actions thus obligated can include all of their consequences,
neither can any description of action exclude all of its consequences.
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you'll probably agree that it's also an exclusive one. Concerning
the good of justice, "deontologists" are notoriously counter-
majoritarian: they want to restrict decision-making to the
righteous.126
So I'd be prepared to argue that every moral view is conse-
quentialist, and thus that any moral view obligates us to form or
join an exclusive community devoted to its pursuit. But I now
want to argue that any such community must be embodied in a
political institution. By this I mean that communities effectively
pursuing moral ends must share two features we associate with
states.
First, such communities confer on their members special duties
of allegiance and rights to protection like those we ascribe to the citi-
zens of a state. Participating in such a community, we are obli-
gated to preserve it as the indispensable vehicle to the pursuit,
and perhaps the definition of our moral goals. This entails pre-
serving the conditions of cooperative planning and action, in-
cluding the continued existence and power of the members.
Thus our devotion to any moral end creates a duty of loyalty to-
wards others devoted to the same end-a reason to care more
about their welfare and to expect such special solicitude in re-
turn. This special duty of loyalty to community members in no
way implies moral indifference to the welfare of others. To the
contrary, fulfillment of the members' moral duties to others may
be the community's reason for existence.
Second, devotion to a common moral end creates a common
jurisdiction conferring special governmental responsibilities. In
order to act effectively, a moral community will need to acquire
resources. At the very least, these resources will include claims
on the powers of the members. Yet the members may also agree
to donate their possessions to the group, as well as their labor.
Alternatively, their labor may generate resources for the commu-
126 See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 283, 285 (1884) (Coler-
idge, J.):
If therefore, Lord Hale is clear ... that extreme necessity of hunger does not
justify larceny, what would he have said to the doctrine that it justified murder?
. . . The American case .... in which it was decided, correctly indeed, that
sailors had no right to throw passengers overboard to save themselves, but on
the somewhat strange ground that the proper mode of determining who was to
be sacrificed was to vote upon the subject by ballot, can hardly . .. be an au-
thority satisfactory to a court in this country.
For examples of rights-based justification for counter-majoritarian judicial review, see
Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Con-
stitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
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nity. In any case, the community will have resources to collec-
tively dispose of, or govern. And members will have reason to
maintain and defend those resources from disposition by others
who are not committed to cooperating in the pursuit of the com-
munity's desired ends. In short, they will have reason to defend
the community's autonomy.
Although autonomous, such a community may be altruistic:
its moral view may entail putting some of its resources at the dis-
posal of deserving non-members. But this is compatible with an
obligation to maintain the existence and efficacy of the commu-
nity by collectively maintaining, governing and defending some
of its resources.
Summarizing, if you have a moral view--any moral view-you
have reason to be concerned about the consequences of your ac-
tions and so the behavior of other people. You have an obliga-
tion to cooperate with those who share your moral view that does
not extend to others. You have an obligation to maintain collec-
tive control of some resources and some of the powers of the
cooperators. This is nothing less than an argument for collective
self-governance by an exclusive community.
We can give this argument a narrower or a broader import.
Its narrow implication is that your own moral views commit you
to associate and share sovereignty with some particular others
and to defend that sovereignty. So any moral view commits you
to the conclusion that at least one boundary is not arbitrary.
A broader implication follows if you think that, other things
equal, individuals should subordinate their desires to their moral
beliefs. If you agree that most individuals' morals, however in-
ferior to your own, are still better than no morals at all, then you
may think it a good thing for people to act on their moral beliefs.
But acting on one's moral beliefs requires that one associate and
share sovereignty with others of like morality. Accordingly, if
you think individuals ought to pursue what they believe to be
moral ends, you cannot be indifferent to whom they share sover-
eignty with. In short, if you wish to respect the autonomy of
others as moral agents, you must respect the autonomy of the
groups through which they inevitably act. Accordingly, you must
reject the principle of arbitrary borders for everyone committed
to the pursuit of some moral end.' 27
127 Critics of group self-determination are not much impressed with arguments from
freedom of association, pointing out that we often share fellowship with unchosen asso-
ciates such as parents, children, comrades-at-arms, and schoolmates, and that we often
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Now I want to emphasize at this point that I don't imagine
that we choose our moral beliefs in a social vacuum and contract
with others to pursue them. We choose among those group
identities we can induce others to ascribe to us, and those norma-
tive interpretations of our group identities other members are
willing to cooperate in pursuing. In this sense, we do not so
much choose our moral communities as we are chosen by them.
Thus moral choice is best conceived as collective choice and
moral argument best conceived as political argument, addressed
to a historically contingent community rather than an idealized
individual.' 28
There is a final difficulty confronting this view of moral choice
as communal rather than individual: That we are often commit-
ted to multiple moral ends suggests that we can remain in-
dependent of any single community or cause. Does this potential
for divided loyalty mean that moral agents are ultimately individ-
uals autonomously choosing between competing collective
claims? To the contrary, one reason we so often find ourselves
committed to incompatible moral views is because we find our-
selves chosen by overlapping moral communities. The fact re-
mains that to act morally, we need others to act with, and to
choose morally, we need others to choose with. Moral action
therefore requires membership in polities, multiple though those
polities may be.' 29
treat governments to which we have not consented as legitimate. See BEiTZ, supra note
97, at 77-80; William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1409-
10 (1991). I argue, however, that by cooperating in a common cause, those of like mo-
rality generate a good distinct from freedom of association, namely, the good of con-
forming conduct to conscience.
128 There are two points here: First, any individual action is dependent upon social
support or tolerance, so that a moral decision is never an individual's alone. Second,
outside of any social context, we would have no way to identify our own preferences or
value commitments. See S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS: PERSONALITY AND POLITY 314-
56 (1989); Guyora Binder, What's Left, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 2002-07 (1991). In both
of these senses we never address our moral arguments to individual decisionmakers,
since to succeed a moral argument must appear intelligible and persuasive to a larger
community with which we hope that individual will identify. Even when we urge non-
conformity with the norms of a dominant community, we call our interlocutor to account
before some other dissident community with which we expect her to identify.
129 Several value theorists have suggested that normative choice implicates a
number of incompatible value commitments, and that these commitments are contin-
gent social commitments, that is, commitments to particular communities. See DON
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990), reviewed by Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal
Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520 (1992). See also HURLEY, supra note 128, at 317 ("[With-
out] formal and substantive distinctions within agents, among the various values and
circumstances that inform their desires and beliefs . . .the element of determination is
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Membership in multiple polities is possible because, as the
legal realists revealed, sovereignty is divisible. No brooding om-
nipotence, sovereignty in this sense is just any legally enforceable
disposition over the powers of others. 30  Thus sovereignty in-
cludes the statehood claimed by Croatians, but also the local au-
tonomy demanded by the Canadian Indians, and the power-
sharing achieved by the native minority in Fiji. Universalists who
argue that minority cultures can be legally protected by auton-
omy measures short of sovereignty salvage nothing from the
wreck of reductive universalism but a flag. Every legal recognition of
group authority distributes sovereignty to an exclusive group.'3' While
this sovereign power is only partial, all sovereignty is partial,
even that of the nation-state, hedged and defined by interna-
tional law and politics in countless ways. 132 This divisibility of
sovereignty implies that we can exercise sovereignty as members
of more than one community. And so our commitment to multi-
ple moral ends in no way undercuts our obligation to embody
each of those ends in a self-determining polity. 133
missing from self-determination."). Herzog, in particular, sees value commitments as
arising out of potentially discontinuous roles and sees the availability of discontinuous
roles-spheres of privacy, separations between church and state, forum and bazaar-as
liberalism's modest demand.
On this revisionist view, liberalism may not require individualism. Perhaps in the
postmodern world, we are all citizens of diverse and competing communities, members
of more than one culture, loci for more than one cultural identity. Certainly the critical
tradition from Kant forward treats internal contradiction as endemic to modern life-
but it also treats internal contradiction as the occasion for the criticism that dialectically
drives forward individual self-definition and collective history.
Indeed, we can go so far as to say that the subjectivity so vilified by poststructuralist
and postmodernist criticism is the interior experience of confronting and critically re-
evaluating one's own competing commitments. For these latter day critical movements,
conflicting commitments must simply reverberate. There is no self and no history
through which they can be narratively resolved.
One pragmatist response is that we are each composed of a myriad of commitments,
not just two, and we can always call upon these other commitments to adjudicate any
conflict. The critical subject or self or moral agent is simply whatever moral commit-
ments are not currently before the court of criticism.
130 See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
131 "[E]very time persons act through an association-whether agency or partner-
ship, company or trust-they exercise a portion of sovereignty." ArthurJ.Jacobson, The
Private Use of Public Authority. Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 599, 665 (1980).
132 See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 16-25
(1987); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 29-30 (2d ed.
1979).
133 If those polities cannot peaceably coexist, we may find ourselves the site of a
boundary dispute. I doubt that most of us, faced with conflicting obligations, feel a
sense of freedom and independence.
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C. The Mutual Dependence of Democracy and Group Autonomy
That the serious pursuit of any moral end requires the crea-
tion and empowerment of a bounded community is another way
of saying that moral action is a form of politics. Moral action is a
collective project only because the political pursuit of any end is a
collective project. That group autonomy enables political action
brings us back to our original problem: What was the link
glimpsed by romantic political theorists between democracy and
community, between the universalist and nationalist elements of
self-determination?
Does democracy require community? Does community re-
quire democracy? My argument that moral action requires group
autonomy has something to say about each of these questions.
The dependence of democracy on community is implicit in
my argument for group autonomy. My characterization of moral
action as a kind of politics rests on a conception of politics as
collective action, coordinated by such communicative practices as
deliberation, persuasion, and negotiation. On this view, politics
is more than a matter of opinion privately held. A right to par-
ticipate in politics therefore means more than the right to answer
an opinion poll; it entails a right to coordinate action with others.
Accordingly, democracy is more than a mere assemblage of indi-
vidual rights. It requires a society mobilized for political action-
organized, that is, into movements.
We can see this most vividly in states that seek to democratize
without a mobilized society. Almost invariably, they fashion na-
tionalist ideologies.' 34 Granted, in the developing world, such
nationalism rarely penetrates much below the level of the elites,
but then neither does political participation. I think the cynical
societies of the post-communist world confront their leaders with
a similar deficit of mobilization. What explains the conjunction
of democratization and national separatism in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union? Not the history of ethnic discrimi-
134 See RUPERT EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION: THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF
ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES (1960); Lucian W. Pye, Identity and the Political Culture, in
LEONARD BINDER ET AL., CRISES AND SEQUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 101 (1971)
(importance of national identity for political participation); Sidney Verba, Sequences and
Development, in CRISES AND SEQUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 283, 311(national identity is often a prerequisite to mass participation and legitimacy); Myron
Weiner, Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process, in CRISES AND SEQUENCES IN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 159, 166-67, 170-72 (nationalism can substitute for
mobilization as a catalyst for political participation), 181 (high levels of political partici-
pation may preclude nationalist ideologies).
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nation that reductionists would expect. For all their faults, the
communist regimes did a relatively decent job of holding ethnic
conflict in check.135
So why has nationalism, suppressed for fifty years,
reemerged? I submit that it has come back for want of any other
vehicle for organizing political participation and legitimating
government. 3 6 For fifty years, communist regimes by and large
shut politics down. Who, in the former Soviet republics, has any
basis in their own experience for trusting elected officials to obey
law, or for trusting their newly rights-bearing fellow citizens to
obey elected officials? The primary threat facing these societies
is not discrimination, but the Hobbesian war of all against all. I
submit that it is chaos which is provoking ethnic conflict, and not
the other way around. 37 Nor do I think we should overestimate
national feeling in such turbulent circumstances. 138 Just because
135 The Communist regimes in polyethnic states juggled their competing rhetorical
commitments to revolutionary internationalism and national self-determination, but
managed to keep a lid on ethnic strife. In the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslo-
vakia power was concentrated in the hands of ethnic Russians, Serbs, and Czechs respec-
tively-but this power was defended by internationalist rhetoric while nationalist
rhetoric typically connoted deference to minority rights. CONNOR, supra note 31, at 430-
44 (Yugoslavia), 392-407 (Soviet Union), 444-47 (Czechoslovakia); GEOFFREY HOSKING,
THE AWAKENING OF THE SOVIET UNION 76-88 (1990) (Soviet Union). In East Germany,
the internationalist strand of Marxism always received more emphasis than elsewhere
because of the East German Communists' self-identification as anti-Nazis. CONNOR,
supra note 31, at 452-54; PETER SCHNEIDER, THE GERMAN COMEDY: SCENES OF LIFE AF-
TER THE WALL 154-56 (1991).
136 To the extent that democratic politics are getting off the ground in Russia and
the Ukraine without resort to nationalism, it is because of the reconstruction of an incip-
ient civil society permitted under Gorbachev's Perestroika. See generally HOSKING, supra
note 135. Similarly, the survival of nationalist politics in all of the polyethnic communist
states probably results less from the suppression of nationalism by central governments
than from its accommodation and adaptation. See generally id. at 76-111; CONNOR, supra
note 31.
137 See Eric Hobsbawm, The Perils of the New Nationalism, THE NATION, Nov. 4, 1991, at
537, 556:
Baltic and Caucasian separatism, and conflicts between Serbs and Croats, and
Czechs and Slovaks, were not serious problems in 1917, or could not have ex-
isted before the establishment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. What has
made those problems acute is not the strength of national feeling, which was no
greater than in countries like Britain and Spain, but the disintegration of cen-
tral power, for this forced even Soviet or Yugoslav republics that did not dream
of separation, like Kazakhstan and Macedonia, to assert independence as a
means of self-preservation.
To quote ... Czech historian [Miroslav Hroch]: "Where an old regime
disintegrates, where old social relations have become unstable, amid the rise of
general insecurity, belonging to a common language and culture may become
the only certainty in society, the only value beyond ambiguity and doubt."
138 "In both Ukraine and Russia, the largest and most important Soviet successor
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federal governments have fallen is no reason to assume ethnically
identified regional governments will stand.
Post-communist Russia's almost continuous state of constitu-
tional crisis reiterates that democratic legitimacy is not a natu-
rally occurring phenomenon, achieved simply by toppling
totalitarians and invoking the rights of man. Democratic legiti-
macy is a cooperative achievement, obstructed by the passivity
and venality repression leaves in its wake, 13 9 and further ham-
pered by communism's near complete suppression of private as-
sociations. ,40 After the wall there remain few institutions capable
of credibly vouching for the legitimacy of new governments.
One solution to this dilemma is to turn outside of the coun-
try-to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
the International Monetary Fund and so on, for not just eco-
nomic, but political credit.' 41 Another solution, however, is to
revive political identities and passionate causes that have lain
dormant for decades. Thus the appeal of rewarmed nationalism.
Pan-German nationalism enabled East Germany to combine
both strategies. Reunification not only gave East Germany a sud-
den transfusion of Euro-prosperity, it preempted any legitima-
tion crisis by integrating it into an up-and-running democratic
polity. For East Germans, then, reunification may have simply
meant reintegration into cosmopolitan Europe; 42 but for West
Germans, reunification provided an irresistible opportunity to
states, nationalism has taken an extraordinarily moderate form." Francis Fukuyama,
Rest Easy. It's Not 1914 Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992 (Final Edition), Sec. 4, at 17.
139 See Andris Saj6, Democratization in Hungary, Public Lecture at S.U.N.Y. at Buf-
falo Law School (Oct. 22, 1989) (describing the cynicism and passivity of the Hungarian
citizenry in the face of Communism's collapse).
140 The exact extent of that suppression and its timing in various countries are much
in controversy. For further discussion and sources, see Guyora Binder, Post-Totalitarian
Politics, 91 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
141 "Increasingly... governments whose legitimacy is questioned are turning to the
international system for that validation which their national polis is as yet unable to
give." Franck, supra note 3, at 50-51. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Vaclav Havel has
hoped to secure Czech democracy by turning the CSCE's human rights principles into
binding treaty obligations backed up by the sanction of intervention. Article 2 of the
Czech bill of rights prescribes that "International Agreements on Human Rights and
Basic Freedoms [once] ratified.., are generally binding on its territory and take prece-
dence over law." Czechoslovak Constitutional Law of January 1991, art. 2, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Law File. Boris Yeltsin's successful efforts to win IMF backing
may be understood similarly as an effort to ensure the stability of his regime rather than
his country's economy. For various other ways in which external forces can support or
encourage new democratic regimes, see GIUSEPPE Di PALMA, To CRAFT DEMOCRACIES:
AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 183-99 (1990).
142 SCHNEIDER, supra note 135, at 49, 148 (materialistic motives of East Germans for
supporting reunification).
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sanitize German nationalism by putting it in the service of de-
mocracy, capitalism, and European union. 14 3
The Croatian and Lithuanian nationalisms that catalyzed the
dissolution of the Yugoslav and Soviet states were similarly am-
biguous. In each case, Roman Catholicism provided the fulcrum
for a critique of the secular, universalist ideology of socialism as a
foreign imposition. But at the same time, political identification
with Roman Catholicism implied claims by the richest and west-
ernmost regions of the Yugoslav and Soviet states to inclusion in
a new European polity. Indeed, Samuel Huntington has sug-
gested that the wave of democratization that has swept across the
world from the Philippines through Latin America to Eastern Eu-
rope is best understood as a redefinition of the Roman Catholic
political community beginning in Iberia in the 1970's. 144 The
global reinterpretation of Catholicism as compatible with democ-
racy made Catholic nationalism more appealing at home and
more legitimate abroad. In Eastern Europe, then, as in the third
world, nationalist ideology articulates simultaneous appeals for
domestic mobilization and foreign recognition.
That democracy requires solidarity does not, of course, mean
that it requires nationalist chauvinism. Nevertheless, the realiza-
tion that democracy requires solidarity is a genuine contribution
of nationalist political theory. For Rousseau, the democratic
state was itself a community. Democratic deliberation could get
nowhere unless citizens were sufficiently identified with the en-
tire polity to think only of the public interest. 145 More pluralistic,
Hegel reasoned that identification with and participation in the
democratic state must be mediated through the diverse associa-
tions and interest groups that make up civil society.146 Roman-
tics both, these nationalists saw solidarity as an achievement of
artifice, not a natural inheritance. Consistent with the romantic
143 Id. at 50-52 (example of resurgent nationalism), 189-90 (German resentment
over having to express shame over Nazi past), 63 (German renunciation of claims to
Polish Silesia reassures West), 31, 178 (European support for German reunification).
144 See Samuel P. Huntington, Religion and the Third Wave, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
Summer 1991, at 29.
145 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 63-74 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
1968).
146 HEGEL, supra note 34, 157, 170-173, 253-255, 301-309; see also SHLOMO
AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 104-05, 161-67 (1972); GIERKE, supra
note 4; BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY
(1966). For applications of Hegel's view to the predicament of Eastern Europe, seeJEAN
L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992); HOSKING,
supra note 135; Janina Frentzel-Zagorska, Civil Society in Poland and Hungary, 42 SOVIET
STUD. 759 (1990).
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tradition, then, the communities mediating political action may
be diverse and they may be of recent origin. They are nonethe-
less an indispensable condition to the achievement of democracy.
What of the second possible link between democracy and
community: Must communities be democratic? Surely not, un-
less devoted to a particular morality that so dictates. But must
communities be democratic in order to claim a right to auton-
omy? Quite possibly.
Recall that my broader argument against the principle of arbi-
trary boundaries depended on the idea that other things equal,
people ought to be able to pursue their moral values. I sug-
gested that the right of individuals to conform conduct to con-
science gave moral communities a claim to autonomy. Recall
also that I based this right of individuals to conform conduct to
conscience on respect for their autonomy as moral agents.
But if respecting the autonomy of moral communities is nec-
essary for respecting the moral autonomy of individuals, it may
not be sufficient. What if the individual members of a moral
community simply serve as foot-soldiers subject to the command
of a charismatic leader? Can we really say that members are com-
mitted to a community's moral ends if they do not themselves
reflect on the meaning of those ends and evaluate the commu-
nity's conduct in light of them? Wouldn't we say that these com-
munity members were motivated only by loyalty to the leader
rather than by their own moral beliefs? Suppose that other mem-
bers privately reflect on the community's best course, but keep
their own counsel: can they really said to be cooperating in the
pursuit of the community's moral ends, if they withhold their
own judgment as to what those ends require? If individuals un-
questioningly follow orders, don't they act as mere agents rather
than as members of the community? We will feel strongly
tempted to say that to exercise moral autonomy an individual
must participate in the decisions as well as the actions of her com-
munity. 47 Only if a moral community is democratic in this sense,
we might conclude, can it claim a right to autonomy.
In basing group autonomy on individual autonomy, do we re-
vert back to the reductive view that derives the collective right of
self-determination from the human rights of individuals? Not if
we conceive individual autonomy in the romantic spirit.
147 For an argument that individual moral autonomy does indeed require participa-
tion in collective deliberation, see HURLEY, supra note 128, at 322-33.
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It is in this romantic conception of individual freedom that we
will find the association of democracy with community that con-
temporary philosophers find so puzzling. The modern philoso-
pher sees freedom in each individual's pursuit of her own
conception of the good. But for the philosophical tradition from
Rousseau to the young Hegelians, expressing oneself in this way
was nothing more than a surrender to impulse, an index of ne-
cessity rather than freedom.' 48 True freedom was to be found in
the onerous but creative task of realizing one's self. Rather than
accepting herself as determined by circumstance, the romantic
was driven to determine herself by seeking education and recog-
nition from worthy others. Thus her conception of the good was
never simply her own-it was always mediated by some
community. 49
Many latter-day romantics continue to see freedom as a col-
lective pursuit, requiring embodiment in an enduring political
community. Carol Gould argues that courses of action maximize
freedom only if they are self-developmental, by which she means
they must meet three conditions: they must "express the agents'
own purposes," "involve the growth of capacities," and "serve to
realize long-range projects." 5 0
Jon Elster has pointed out the dependence of each of these
three indices of self-development on community. Our ability to
express ourselves depends on developing skill in handling some
socially constructed medium of expression. Thus, it depends
upon social contexts in which we can receive training, encourage-
ment, and recognition from competent others. The laborious ac-
quisition of skill, Elster hypothesizes, is neither as intrinsically
rewarding nor as socially recognized as its exercise. Accordingly,
we are unlikely to skill ourselves without advance assurance that
the social context for acquiring and exercising the skill will en-
dure. Conceived as a long-term project of self-realization, the
exercise of freedom depends on communities that have the
148 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 1-23.
149 The classic argument that individual identity is necessarily socially mediated is
found in GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 218-40 (J.B. Baillie trans.,
1967). The most influential examples of the mediation of individual preferences by
larger collectivities in romantic political thought are Hegel's idea of the "corporation"
and Rousseau's idea of the "general will." HEGEL, supra note 34, 252-253, 290, 303,
308; ROUSSEAU, supra note 145, at 69-78, 149-54; see also AVINERI, supra note 146, at 161-
75; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 437, 443.
150 CAROL C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION
IN POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 51 (1988).
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power to preserve themselves. 15
While latter-day romantics acknowledge that any skilled en-
deavor can foster self-realization, they have particularly insisted
that politics is such an art. Empirical studies of democratic par-
ticipation suggest that the deliberative process informs its partici-
pants, skills them in rhetoric and conflict-resolution, may involve
mutual recognition, and may inform compliance with majority
will with meaning. 5 2 What differentiates political deliberation
from war and commerce is that it is less about the pursuit of inter-
ests than their definition. It requires the mobilizing of communi-
ties, the evocation of group identities, and the interpretation of
traditions. Democratic politics is a work of the imagination in
which, together, we identify our interests, and ourselves.'
If, with these latter day romantics, we see our own best selves
as contingent on the existence of a certain sort of community, we
won't see the right to pursue our chosen ends as an adequate
vision of freedom; we won't see merely respecting this right as an
adequate standard of morality; and we won't see the right to ap-
prove or disapprove our leaders as an adequate conception of
self-rule. We will see our own ability to define ourselves, to act
on our moral beliefs and to govern ourselves as requiring the
creation and protection of a particular culture.
IV. CONCLUSION
Self-determination claims have traditionally combined de-
mands for popular sovereignty and national independence. De-
spite its formal endorsement of a right to self-determination,
however, international law has restricted secession to a
decolonization context it cannot define. International lawyers
have implicitly, and political philosophers have explicitly reduced
self-determination to majority rule within arbitrary boundaries,
permitting secession only as a remedy of last resort for discrimi-
nation. This reductive view of self-determination effaces its na-
tionalist component altogether.
I have tried to partially resuscitate self-determination's na-
tionalist component by attacking two important tenets of the re-
ductive view: the principle of arbitrary boundaries and its
151 Jon Elster, Self-realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life,
3 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 97 (1986).
152 See Binder, supra note 128, at 2020-21, 2028-29 (1991) (discussing several such
studies).
153 GOULD, supra note 150; Elster, supra note 151.
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corollary that particular boundaries are justifiable only as means
to securing individual rights. In attacking the principle of arbi-
trary boundaries and the reduction of group to individual rights,
I have left several aspects of the reductive view standing. I agree
that national identity is neither a natural fact nor one by itself
deserving of protection. I agree that the separatist preferences
of most of a territory's residents are not by themselves enough to
justify independence. I agree that self-determination can some-
times be secured by privileges short of statehood. But I also in-
sist that any special privileges are political boundaries, that
political boundaries can be justified, and that such justifications
are not always reducible to the rights of individuals.
In so insisting, I have offered eight claims. First, I have taken
it as conceded that particular political boundaries may be neces-
sary for securing particular cultures. Second, I have shown that
cultures are not fungible instruments to the achievement of indi-
vidual aims, but that they are constitutive of such aims. Third, I
have shown that moral action requires participation in and per-
petuation of a culture. From this it followed, fourth, that moral
action is a form of political action-that is, that the pursuit of any
moral end commits us to erect and defend particular political
boundaries. I have suggested, fifth, that respect for the moral
autonomy of others entails respect for these boundaries. Sixth,
generalizing to all political action the narrower claim that moral
action requires group autonomy, I have concluded that demo-
cratic politics requires group autonomy. Seventh, reasoning that
moral autonomy requires active participation in the decisionmak-
ing of a moral community, I have suggested that the autonomy
rights of groups should depend upon their democratic govern-
ance. Finally, I have argued that the individual moral autonomy
enabled by democracy cannot exist apart from the democratically
governed groups within which it is exercised. Based on these
eight claims, I conclude that political boundaries can be justified
by a right of autonomy for democratically governed groups de-
voted to moral ends-a right not reducible to the rights of
individuals.
"Self-determination of peoples" is more than a misleading
euphemism for the political and civil rights of individuals. It
rightly asserts the connections among solidarity, self-govern-
ment, and self-realization.
And that's "The Case for Self-Determination."
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